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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT TO ACHIEVE THE PEER PERFORMANCE
BENCHMARK
by
Sheng Yi
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor Abhijit Barua, Major Professor
Other than three extensively researched earnings thresholds, avoiding earnings
declines, avoiding negative earnings and avoiding negative earnings surprises
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999), peer performance
is an additional threshold that is often mentioned in news reports, compensation contracts
and analysts’ reports, while largely ignored in the academic research. Thus, I examine
whether firms manage earnings to achieve peer performance. First, I examine accrualsbased earnings management to achieve peer performance. The empirical results show that
firms exhibit more income-increasing accruals management in the current year under the
following situations: 1) when firms’ prior year performance is below that of their peer
group; 2) when firms’ average performance over the prior two years is below that of its
peer group; 3) when firms’ expected performance is below its peer group’s expected
performance. In addition, firms with cumulative performance that is lower than that of its
peer group through the first three quarters of the fiscal year exhibit more upward accruals
management in the fourth quarter. Second, I investigate real activities manipulation to
achieve peer performance. The empirical results show that that firms exhibit more
vi

income-increasing real activities manipulation in the current year under the following
situations: 1) when firms’ prior year performance is below that of their peer group; 2)
when firms’ average performance over the prior two years is below that of its peer group.
Third, firms that are under pressure to achieve peer performance benchmarks tend to
restate financial statements in subsequent years. Specifically, firms under the following
four situations are more likely to restate current earnings in the future: 1) firm’s prior
year performance is below that of its peer group; 2) firm’s average performance over the
prior two years is below that of its peer group; 3) firm’s expected performance is below
that of its peer group; and 4) firm’s cumulative performance for the first three fiscal
quarters is below that of its peer group. The influence of peer performance on earnings
management behavior implies that relative performance evaluation can induce incomeincreasing earnings management and subsequent restatements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior studies (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and
Zeckhauser 1999) identify three earnings thresholds managers seek to achieve when they
report financial statements: avoiding negative earnings, avoiding earnings declines, and
avoiding negative earnings surprises. A large number of studies use these three earnings
thresholds to test earnings management in various research settings. This dissertation
investigates another potential earnings management threshold, peer performance, which
has been largely ignored in the extant literature.
Both Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) explain
threshold-driven earnings management behavior by referring to prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979), which suggests that for a given increase in wealth, the
corresponding increase in value is greatest when the increase in wealth moves from
negative to positive territory relative to a reference point (viz., zero earnings, zero change
in earnings, or zero forecast error). While they do not specifically explain the formulation
of reference points or the usage of other reference points beyond those extensively
investigated three earnings thresholds, they imply the existence of other reference points
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). They also suggest that if other reference points are used
either by corporate boards or investors, and if those reference points are reflected in the
executives’ reward or compensation contracts, executives are likely to manage reported
earnings in order to meet or beat those reference points (Degeorge et al. 1999). This study
examines whether peer performance is another such reference point that managers try to
achieve by managing reported earnings.
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Peer firms’ performance is widely mentioned as a benchmark in press releases,
compensation contracts and analysts’ reports. In other words, a firm’s performance is
often benchmarked against its competitors’ performance by analysts, individual investors,
institutional investors, compensation committees, and managers.1 Prior studies provide
substantial evidence that peer firms’ performance is benchmarked in setting and
implementing executive compensation contracts (e.g., Antle and Smith 1986; Gibbons
and Murphy 1990; Barro and Barro, 1990; Garvey and Milbourn, 2003 etc.). More
recently, by using an implicit approach based on industry membership and firm size to
identify peer firms, Albuqerque (2009) provides consistent evidence of relative
performance evaluation (RPE) in the level and change of CEO compensation. Gong, Li
and Shin (2011) use an explicit approach based on proxy disclosures to identify peer
firms, and provide evidence of RPE. They also report that about 25 percent of their
sample firms explicitly use RPE in setting executive compensation. A typical example of
using peer performance as a benchmark can be observed in the following excerpt from
the 2014 proxy statement of Analog Devices. Inc.,
“In setting our targets, we use an assessment of our business results relative to our
peers to ensure that our performance targets are appropriately calibrated. Our
Compensation Committee’s independent consultant, PM&P, conducted an
analysis, which compared our performance against the five-year average

1

For example, an article in The Wall Street Journal on May 2, 2015 states, “The lending club is getting
awfully crowded. On Tuesday, LendingClub Corp. posted earnings above expectations, reporting a surge in
new loans, even as it cited growing congestion in the industry. Like OnDeck Capital, another online lender
that reported earnings this week, LendingClub said it was spending large sums to advertise to new
customers and stand out in an increasingly packed marketplace. Neither company recorded a profit—
LendingClub posted a loss of $6.4 million in the first quarter while OnDeck said it lost $5.3 million—but
the rapid loan growth the lenders reported illustrates why others are rushing to the sector.”
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performance of our peers, including revenue growth and operating profits to help
us determine the appropriate targets for fiscal 2013…”
Besides compensation, prior research also suggests that executives are concerned
about their career when their firm performs below industry peer performance, because
RPE is used in CEO turnover decisions. Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006) document
that a CEO’s outside career opportunities depend on his/her firm’s performance relative
to industry peer performance. Moreover, board of directors’ ability to identify relatively
incompetent CEOs increases with the use of RPE. DeFond and Park (1999) document
that CEO turnover is associated with RPE-based accounting measures (industry-adjusted
earnings). Thus, peer performance can influence CEO careers. Financial analysts use
peer firms to compare performance and to support their valuation multiples, earnings
forecasts, and overall stock recommendations (e.g., Bradshaw 2011). Analysts’ choice of
peer firms has prompted the attention of academic researchers. De Franco, Hope, and
Larcoque (2012) find that sell-side equity analysts select peer firms with high valuation
multiples. Other groups, such as individual investors and fund managers, also use peer
firms in their investing decisions. Financial statement analysis textbooks routinely
recommend the use of peer firms in business valuation processes (Healy and Palepu
2007; Stickney, Brown, and Wahlen 2007; Damondaran 2009). Investors use peer firms
to judge the merits and comparability of investments (De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi
2011). Fund managers use peer firms in structuring their investment portfolios (Chan,
Lakonishok, and Swaminathan 2007).
Thus, managers have incentives to achieve or exceed peer performance. I examine
whether managers engage in income-increasing earnings management when they face
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pressure to achieve peer performance. I develop hypotheses based on firms’ prior
performance, current expected performance, and current interim quarters’ performance
relative to their peer group. I argue that firms manage current year reported earnings
when the prior year’s performance (or the average of the prior two years’ performance) is
lower than the peer group. I use these windows because, in many cases, compensation
contracts are based on three year’s relative metrics.2 I also argue that if a firm’s expected
performance for the current year is lower than that of its peer group, they are likely to
manage earnings upward. I then conjecture firms manage fourth quarter’s earnings
upward when the first three quarters’ cumulative performance is lower than that of its
peer group.
I identify the peer group based on industry-size quartile following Albuquerque
(2009). I test my hypotheses by conducting analyses of both accruals and real earnings
management. To examine accruals management, I use two proxies for discretionary
accruals, abnormal total accruals (ATA) and abnormal current accruals (ACA), which are
measured using a version of the Modified Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney
1995) adjusted for performance (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005). I use two proxies for
real activities manipulation, unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures
(rmUDISX) following Zang (2012), and abnormal cash flow from operations (rmCASH)
following Roychowdhury (2006). After providing evidence that firms engage in incomeincreasing earnings management to achieve peer performance, I show that firms

2

For example, excerpt from 2014 proxy statement of Avery Dennison Corporation states, “As discussed in
further detail in Compensation Discussion and Analysis, the performance units granted under both the
2008-2010 Mid-Term Incentive Plan (“MTIP”) and the 2009-2011 MTIP were cancelled because we did
not meet the threshold level for the applicable performance objectives. Multi-year vesting and performance
periods promote stockholder value creation and long-term growth.”

4

associated with income-increasing earnings management to achieve peer performance are
more likely to restate their financial statements subsequently.
The empirical results show that firms exhibit more income-increasing accruals
management in the current year under the following situations: 1) when firms’ prior year
performance is below that of their peer group; 2) when firms’ average performance over
the prior two years is below that of its peer group; 3) when firms’ expected performance
is below its peer group’s expected performance. In addition, firms with cumulative
performance that is lower than that of its peer group through the first three quarters of the
fiscal year exhibit more upward accruals management in the fourth quarter.
Next, I examine real activities manipulation to achieve peer performance. The
empirical results show that that firms exhibit more increase-increasing real activities
manipulation in the current year under the following situations: 1) when firms’ prior year
performance is below that of their peer group; 2) when firms’ average performance over
the prior two years is below that of its peer group.
I do not find evidence consistent with firms using real activities manipulation
when firms’ expected performance is below its peer group’s expected performance. One
possible explanation could be that it takes time to manipulate real activities, such as
offering price discounts, engaging in overproduction, and reducing discretionary
expenditures aggressively (Roychowdhury 2006). In addition, the real activities
manipulation must occur during the fiscal year, while accruals can be managed even after
the fiscal year-end (Zang 2012). Firms compare their performance to the expected peer
performance at the end of the fiscal year to determine the extent of earnings management,
when it is not possible to manipulate real activities.

5

In addition, contrary to my expectation, the empirical results show that firms with
cumulative performance that is lower than that of its peer group through the first three
quarters of the fiscal year exhibit more downward real activities manipulation in the
fourth quarter. One possible explanation could be that managers adjust the level of
accrual-based earnings management according to the level of real activities manipulation.
Thus, there is a negative relation between the amount of accrual-based earnings
management and the amount of unexpected real activities manipulation (Zang 2012). I
observe a positive correlation between accruals management in the fourth quarter and
firms with cumulative performance that is lower than that of its peer group through the
first three quarters of the fiscal year. Thus, I observe a negative correlation between real
earnings management in the fourth quarter and firms with cumulative performance that is
lower than that of its peer group through the first three quarters of the fiscal year.
Finally, I also investigate the likelihood of future restatements of financial
statements for firm-year observations that are subject to earnings management to achieve
peer performance. Restatements of financial statements is a consequence of prior
earnings management. I find that firms under the following four situations are more likely
to restate current earnings in the future: 1) Firm’s prior year performance is below that of
its peer group; 2) Firm’s average performance over the prior two years is below that of its
peer group; 3) Firm’s expected performance is below that of its peer group; 4) Firm’s
cumulative performance of the first three quarters is below that of its peer group.
In this dissertation, I provide empirical evidence that managers engage in earnings
management to achieve peer performance. My research makes the following
contributions. First, this study adds another earnings benchmark, peer performance,
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which managers seek to achieve, and which has been largely ignored in the extant
literature on earnings management, although it has been used in RPE for compensation
contracts. Second, this study extends the existing literature on the roles that peer firms
play in influencing operating and financial policies. Leary and Roberts (2014) show, for
example, that peer firms play an important role in determining corporate capital structure
and financial policies. Prior studies also show firms’ fraudulent reporting influence peer
firms’ investment decisions (Beatty, Liao, and Yu 2013), reporting decisions (Kedia,
Koh, and Rajgopal 2015), and research and development, and advertising expenditure
decisions (Li 2015). My research shows that peer firms’ performance also has an impact
on earnings management decisions. Finally, the findings in this study indicate that
although the RPE can improve compensation contracts and enhance the efficiency of
compensation plans, it can have unintended consequences as it may induce incomeincreasing earnings management.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Section II reviews the
literature. Section III develops hypotheses. Section IV describes the research design.
Section V describes the sample selection procedure and data requirements. Empirical
findings are discussed in Section VI. Section VII concludes this study.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
I begin with reviewing the earnings management literature in general and prior
studies on earnings management mechanisms. I then discuss studies documenting
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empirical evidence relating to incentives for earnings management with a focus on
executive compensation. Finally I review prior studies on earnings benchmarks before
suggesting peer performance as a potential earnings threshold for managing earnings.
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as below,
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.”

Earnings Management Mechanisms
Prior accounting research provides evidence of three main mechanisms that
managers use to manage earnings: accruals management, real activity management, and
classification shifting. Accruals management is the most widely used mechanism, and the
extant accounting literature extensively provides evidence of this earnings management
tool. Under this mechanism, managers exercise their discretion over accounting accruals
when reporting financial statements. Healy (1985) uses total accruals as a proxy for
discretionary accruals and documents that managers adopt certain accruals policies,
income-increasing and income decreasing accruals, to maximize their bonus. Subsequent
studies further refine the measure of discretionary accruals, and provides evidence of
earnings management using accruals. Jones (1991) develops an expectation model of
nondiscretionary accruals as a function of changes in revenues and the level of property,
plant and equipment, and documents that managers resort to income-decreasing
discretionary accruals to take advantage of import relief announced by government. Teoh,
8

Wong, and Rao (1998) examine abnormal accruals at the issue-year and during a longrun period after the IPO-year. They find high IPO-year abnormal accruals and low postIPO earnings performance compared to industry peers among those firms. Following
Jones model of discretionary accruals, Perry and Williams (1994) compared the
discretionary accruals of management buyout firms with a set of control firms. They find
that prior to the announcement of the management buyout proposal, the discretionary
accruals of those firms are lower than the control firms, suggesting earnings were
managed downward.
Dechow et al. (1995) refine the Jones model by taking out changes in receivables
from the changes in revenue because changes in receivables are also exposed to accruals
management. Dechow and Dichev (2002) derive a measure of accruals quality that is
based on accrual estimation error, which can be driven by intentional accruals
management or unintentional mistakes in estimation. Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005)
suggest matching the discretionary accruals, calculated from the modified Jones model,
to a firm within the same industry by performance, which is widely known as
performance-matched discretionary accruals. Although the models listed above are
widely used in the extant literature, scholars still question the specification of and power
of these models.
Filing a restatement due to the fact that the prior financial statements were not in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), is the most visible
indicator of improper accounting, according to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). When GAAP violations are committed through accruals manipulations, abnormal
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accruals can be linked to restatement, an indicator that firms adopted aggressive
accounting policies. Studies suggest there is a positive relationship between accruals and
the likelihood of restatements. As early as Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), research
documents that firms subject to accounting enforcement actions by the SEC have higher
total accruals and discretionary accruals. Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011) describe
the process of how accruals management develops into aggressive manipulation. Because
there is a certain flexibility within GAAP, managers resort to aggressive manipulation
after they run out of that flexibility. In many cases, aggressive manipulations of
accounting accruals result into future restatements. In this dissertation, I use the
restatement as the consequence of prior accruals management.
Under real earnings management managers manipulate earnings through
investment and operational activities, which have an impact mostly on cash flows.
Roychowdhury (2006) defines such real activities manipulation as “management actions
that deviate from normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective of
meeting certain earnings thresholds.” Evidence of managing investment activities can be
traced back to the research on research and development (R&D) expenditures. Baber,
Fairfield, and Haggard (1991) find that managers reduce the R&D spending in the current
period to reach positive income or to report an increasing trend of income.. Dechow and
Sloan (1991) document that CEOs reduce R&D expenditures prior to their departure from
firm in order to reach a higher compensation level through the earnings-based bonus plan..
Operational activities, such as advertising and maintenance costs, overproducing to
decrease cost of goods sold, are used to manipulate earnings as well. In the Graham,
Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) survery of 401 financial executives, 80% of them agree
10

with manipulating expenditures on R&D, advertising and maintenance to achieve
earnings benchmarks. Roychowdhury (2006) developed models to estimate the level of
cash flow manipulation, the level of over-production, and the level of discretionary
expenditures such as R&D, advertising, and maintenance.
Misclassification of items within the income statement, to inflate or deflate
subtotals (i.e., core earnings, operating earnings, noncore expenses) without affecting the
bottom line net income, is another type of earnings management mechanism. Since core
expenses and special items are reported in the income statement separately, and analysts’
mainly focus on core earnings, managers shift core expenses to special items to meet
analysts’ annual forecasts. (McVay 2006). Kinney and Trezevant (1997) state that firms
use income-decreasing special items to keep an increasing trend of core earnings. By
developing a model that captures unexpected core earnings, McVay (2006) finds a
positive relation between unexpected core earnings and the magnitude of incomedecreasing special items, which is consistent with shifting core expenses to special items
Because of the innate problem that accruals include accrual special items, it is
problematic to condition core earnings expectations on contemporaneous accruals
(McVay 2006), Fan, Barua, Cready, and Thomas (2010) exclude contemporaneous
accruals from the core earnings expectation model and augment the model by adding a
return variable as a proxy for performance. By using quarterly data, and analyzing
incentives such as meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts and flexibility in accruals
management, they provide consistent evidence of classification shifting under specific
settings, such as in the fourth quarter compared to the interim quarters. Other than the
classification of special items, Barua, Lin, and Sbaraglia (2010) investigate the
11

classification shifting of core expenses to discontinued operations. They find firms move
core expenses to discontinued operations to increase core earnings. One of the
motivations for such shifting is to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. In an international
setting, Haw, Ho, and Li (2011) use East-Asia economic data and find consistent results
with McVay (2006). In addition, they find firms with family controlling shareholders are
engaged in a higher level of expense misclassification, suggesting concentrated
ownership structures play an important role in the level of misclassification shifting. In
addition to misclassification of items within the income statement, firms can also engage
in misclassification of items within the cash flow statement. Lee (2012) examines the
misclassification of cash flows in specific settings, such as classifying tax benefits as
operating cash flows.
A stream of research studies the substitutions and preferences by managers among
different earnings management mechanisms. Zang (2012) investigates whether managers
trade-off between real activities manipulation and accruals management. They find that
the relationship between the level of real activities manipulation and the level of accruals
management is significant and negative, after controlling for the costs of real activities
manipulation and the costs of accruals management. Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008)
investigate the level of real activities manipulation and accruals management before and
after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). They find that firms manage earnings to
reach benchmarks before and after the passage SOX, yet accruals management is used
less in the post-SOX period and the level of real earnings management is higher in the
post-SOX period. Fan et al. (2010) find that classification shifting is more profound when
the ability of managers to manipulate accruals is constrained. Graham, Harvey, and
12

Rajgopal (2005) find that only 7.9% of their survey participants choose to alter
accounting assumptions if they are below the desired target while 79.9% choose to
decrease discretionary spending. Badertscher (2011) studies the relationship between
firm’s duration of overvaluation and its earnings management choices. He finds that
overvaluation initially drives firms to engage in accruals management, then they switch
to real activities manipulation after running out of accruals management flexibility.

Managerial Compensation as Earnings Management Incentives
Prior studies examining compensation contracts as earnings management
incentives shows that managers use accounting judgement to increase or decrease
earnings to maximize their wealth. Early accounting research recognizes that because
accounting numbers are used in compensation, accounting choices affect wealth, and thus
affect agency costs (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). Healy (1985) finds that the direction
of accruals management is contingent on the bonus plan. When the bonus plan’s upper
bound is exceeded reached or the lower bound cannot be reached, the proportion of
negative accruals are much larger compared to the rest of the sample. Guidary, Leone,
and Rock (1998) use business unit-level data to test whether managers use discretionary
accruals to maximize their short-term bonuses. Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995)
show that firms report accruals that defer income when their bonuses are at their
maximum. In addition to research on bonus plans in compensation contracts, some
research focuses on the stock-based and option-based compensation. Warfield, Wild, and
Wild (1994) find a negative association between abnormal accruals and managerial
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ownership, suggesting managerial ownership reduces the incentives for opportunistic
behavior by managers. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) show that managers build up
large positive abnormal accruals during the period when they exercise options and sell
their firm shares. Burns and Kedia (2006) examine whether stock options in
compensation contracts provide incentives to adopt aggressive accounting practices. They
find that the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price, arising from the CEO’s option
holdings, is positively related to the probability of misreporting. But they find no
evidence that incentives from equity and restricted stock, and long-term incentive payouts
are associated with misreporting. Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) find that
compared with a control sample matched on industry, size, and time, a CEO with a
sizeable amount of in-the-money stock options will largely increase the likelihood of
misstatement. In contrast with other studies on equity incentives, after matching CEOs on
the observable characteristics of their contracting environments using a propensity
matching score approach, Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2010) find no evidence of
a negative association between accounting restatements and the level of CEO equity
incentives.

Earnings Benchmarks
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) identify three earnings
thresholds—avoiding losses, avoiding earnings declines and avoiding negative earnings
surprises. Since then numerous studies (Brown and Caylor 2005; Kasznik and McNichols
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2002; Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna 2003; Barth, Elliott, and Finn 1999) use these
earnings thresholds to investigate earnings management in various settings.
Findings on whether small profits and small loss avoidance represent earnings
management are mixed. Some studies find no evidence of a discontinuity at zero in the
distribution of earnings. Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003) investigate whether
management of discretionary accruals to report a small profit is a reasonable explanation
for the earnings distribution that too few firms report small losses and too many firms
report small profits. They find that discretionary accruals are similar in both the small
profit group and the small loss group. Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson (2007) find that
the discontinuity at zero in the distribution of earnings is due to the asymmetric effects of
income taxes and special items for profit and loss firms. Durtschi and Easton (2005)
provide evidence that the discontinuity at zero in the distribution of earnings is affected
by deflation, sample selection criteria that led to differential inclusion or exclusion of
observations to the left of zero versus observations to the right of zero, and differences
between the characteristics of observations to the left of zero and observations to the right
of zero.
Some studies confirm the finding in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). Jacob and
Jorgensen (2007) aggregate quarterly earnings over annual periods that differ from the
fiscal year and compare the distribution of these alternative annual earnings with those of
fiscal year earnings. They find that annual earnings computed using the alternative
aggregation periods do not exhibit a discontinuity around zero, thus suggesting that
earnings management is responsible for the discontinuity. Beaver, McNichols, and
Nelson (2003) document that property-casualty insurers understate loss reserves in order
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to reach the zero earnings benchmark. Phillips, Pincus, and Rego (2003) examine the
usefulness of deferred tax expense as compared to other accrual measures in detecting
earnings management. They suggest that deferred tax expense is more useful than other
accruals measures in detecting earnings management to meet the avoiding loss
benchmark. Kerstein and Rai (2007) show that a high proportion of firms with small
cumulative profits or losses at the beginning of the fourth-quarter report small annual
profits rather than small annual losses, compared to a control group, which consisted of
firms in the earnings distribution next to treatment group.
In terms of evidence that earnings are likely managed to avoid negative earnings
surprises, Ayers, Jiang, and Yeung (2006) suggest that the positive association between
discretionary accruals and beating the benchmark extends to pseudo targets (i.e. points
other than the zero in the distributions of earnings, earnings changes, and analysts-based
unexpected earnings) derived from the earnings distribution as well as earnings change
distribution, but few positive associations was found between discretionary accruals and
beating pseudo targets derived from analysts-based unexpected earnings distribution.
Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) find that firms use stock repurchases to increase
earnings per share to meet or beat analysts’ earnings per share forecasts.
Another stream of research examines the motivations associated with the target
beating. Capital market valuation seems to be the most dominant motivation to achieve
earnings thresholds (Matsumoto 2002; Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn. 2002; Kasznik and
McNichols 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002). Graham et al. (2005)
indicates that managers view capital market valuation as one of the main reasons for
achieving earnings thresholds, they also offer other motivations—smoothing earnings,
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reducing stock price volatility, signaling about growth prospects, achieving desired credit
rating, external reputation of management, and earning bonuses. Cheng and Warfield
(2005) find that managers with high equity incentives (i.e. arising from stock-based
compensation and stock ownership) are more likely to report earnings that meet or just
beat analysts’ forecasts and less likely to report large positive earnings surprises.

Peer Performance Benchmark
Peer firms’ performance has been used as a benchmark in evaluating and
compensating corporate executives. Holmstrom (1982) develops a model to describe the
theory of relative performance evaluation (RPE). This theory suggests that the efficiency
of a contract with an agent can be improved by incorporating the performance of agents
exposed to similar business risk. Thus the RPE provides better risk sharing. Since then,
many papers test whether top corporate executives are compensated as if their
performance is evaluated relative to the performance of the company’s competitors. Antle
and Smith (1986) was the first paper that tested this hypothesis. Their results are mixed.
They find weak support for the use of RPE in the total compensation contracts of 16 out
of 39 firms in the chemical, aerospace, and electronics industries during 1947 to 1977.
Barro and Barro (1990) study the relative performance evaluation for CEOs of banks.
Their results suggest that cash compensation is not adjusted for a regional average of
bank performance in their sample of 83 banks during 1982-1987. Gibbons and Murphy
(1990) find evidence supporting weak form of RPE using stock returns as the
performance measure in the compensation contract but no evidence for peer-group
accounting performance (ROA). Janakiraman, Lambert and Larcker (1992) find similar
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results. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) find evidence of RPE when compensation is
defined in levels, but fail to find evidence when using changes in compensation.
Several explanations have been provided for the mixed evidence. Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001) argue that CEOs are rewarded for luck, i.e., changes in firm
performance that are beyond the CEO’s control. Their findings suggest that better
governed firms pay their CEO less for luck. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) show that
RPE is used less in more concentrated industries. Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) argue
that a manager’s outside job opportunities are a positive function of industry stock returns
and that this is stronger for more talented CEOs. Garvey and Milbourn (2003) argue that,
in general, executives can replicate in their private portfolios an indexation that removes
the influence of market-wide factors. But this ability to remove excessive market risk is
constrained by wealth and human capital. Thus there is little RPE for the average
executives, but there is strong evidence of RPE for younger and less wealthy managers.
Rajgopal et al. (2006) find that the lack of RPE is due to the fact that CEO pay varies
with outside employment opportunities. Albuquerque (2009) argues that the mixed
empirical evidence on the use of RPE is due to miss-specified peer groups. She suggests
to form peer groups with similar industry-size firms.

III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The main focus of this study is to investigate empirically whether firms consider
peer performance as another earnings benchmark that they try to achieve using
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managerial discretion in financial reporting process. Managers have earnings
management incentives to reach peer performance in either of these two conditions: 1)
when relative performance evaluation (RPE) is used in compensation and/or dismissal
decisions, and 2) when analysts and investors use peer performance in their valuation and
investing decisions.
With respect to the first condition, Holmstrom (1982) states that an incentive
scheme based on relative performance is superior to an incentive scheme based on
individual performance. RPE provides insurance against external shocks and yields a
more informative measure of CEO actions. Empirical results provided in Albuqerque
(2009), Gong et al. (2011), and Albuqerque (2014) support the use of RPE in CEO
compensation contracts. Albuquerque (2009) states that firms of different sizes are
exposed to different shocks and face different constraints in responding to those shocks.
Her results show systematic evidence supporting the implicit RPE usage in CEO
compensation schemes when peer groups consist of firms within the same industry and
size quartile. Gong et al. (2011) examine the explicit use of RPE in executive
compensation contracts and find that about 25 percent of S&P 1500 firms explicitly used
RPE in 2006. Albuqerque (2014) finds that the implicit use of RPE in CEO compensation
contracts varies negatively with a firm’s growth options (i.e. the proxies for growth
options in Albuqerque 2014 are market-to-book ratio, R&D expenses to assets, and the
ratio of advertising expenses to assets). Other than CEO pay, RPE is also used by the
board of directors in CEO turnover decisions. DeFond and Park (1999) find that CEO
turnover is negatively associated with the level of competition in industries, which
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suggests that boards of directors in highly competitive industries use RPE to identify and
replace poorly performing CEOs.
With respect to the second condition, empirical evidence suggests that investors
and analysts use peer performance in their valuation decision. Analysts often use peers to
compare performance across firms as well as to estimate the market values of the firms
they cover. De Franco et al. (2012) examine how peers are chosen in practice by
manually extracting information on peer firms from analysts’ reports. They show that
analysts are more likely to choose peer firms that are similar in size, leverage, asset
turnover, industry classification and trading volume. Bhojraj and Lee (2002) develop a
systematic approach for the selection of comparable firms. They argue that the choice of
comparable firms should be a function of the variables that drive cross-sectional variation
in a given valuation multiple. Those variables include profitability, growth, and the costof-capital. De Franco et al. (2011) suggest that analysts use comparable peers in their
reports to evaluate the current firm valuation multiples or justify the predicted firm
valuation multiples. Thus, prior research provides support for the conjecture that
managers are likely to manage earnings upward to reach peer performance.
One of the commonly used earnings management mechanisms is accruals
management. The extant literature provides substantial evidence that managers use
discretionary accruals to achieve earnings benchmarks when they report financial
information (Payne and Robb 2000; Matsumoto 2002; Burgstahler and Eames 2006).
Payne and Robb (2002) provide evidence consistent with firms managing abnormal
accruals when pre-managed earnings fall short of analysts’ expectations. Matsumoto
(2002) also finds consistent evidence that accruals are managed upward to avoid negative
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earnings surprises. For specific accruals, Beaver et al. (2003) find that property-casualty
insurers with small positive earnings understate loss reserves relative to insurers with
small negative earnings. Loss reserves are managed across the entire distribution of
earnings, with the most income-increasing reserve accruals reported by small profit firms,
and the most income-decreasing reserve accruals reported by firms with the highest
earnings.
Prior studies (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006, Graham et al. 2005) also provide
evidence that managers engage in real activity management to achieve earnings
benchmarks. Examples of real activity management include reduction of prices to
increase sales, overproduction to reduce costs of goods sold, reduction of discretionary
expenses (Roychowdhury 2006), and reduction of research and development (R&D)
expenses (Baber et al. 1991; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Bushee 1998).
If managers use discretionary accruals and manipulate real activities to manage
earnings upward to achieve peer performance, I expect to observe higher levels of
discretionary accruals and real earning management under the following situations: 1)
Firm’s prior year’s performance is below that of its peer group; 2) Firm’s past two year’s
average performance is below that of its peer group; 3) Firm’s expected current year’s
performance is below that of its peer group; 4) Firm’s first three quarters’ cumulative
performance is below that of its peer group.

Prior Year’s Performance below Peer Performance
When firms fail to meet peer performance benchmarks in the prior year, managers
face increasing pressure to reach peer performance in the current year. The pressure is
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stimulated by the fear of losing compensation, reputation and career prospects. Merchant
(1989), for example, argues that managers who miss financial targets are more concerned
with the associated loss of credibility and intervention than with reductions in bonus
compensation.
Compensation contracts usually contain long-term provisions. Bed Bath &
Beyond Inc., for example, states in their 2014 proxy statement that “performance during
the three-year period will be based on Return on Invested Capital relative to such peer
group.” If the firm fails to reach peer performance in the first year, it still has a chance to
meet and beat peer performance in a three-year period if the firm performs better than its
peers in total over the performance measurement window. Thus, managers of firms with
prior year performance below that of their peers have greater incentives to manage
earnings upward. I operationalize earnings management through income increasing
abnormal accruals and real earnings management, thus formally, my hypothesis is:
H1: Firms with prior year performance below their peer group will exhibit
greater levels of income-increasing earnings management in the current year.

Past Two Year’s Mean Performance below Peer Performance
Allen, Larson, and Sloan (2013) show that “good” accruals relating to temporary
fluctuations in working capital reverse over adjacent fiscal years. Thus, with respect to
accruals management, my first hypothesis can be affected by the normal reversal of
accruals. DeFond and Park (1997) suggest that when managers are not satisfied with
current earnings and they expect future earnings to be good, managers use part of the
future earnings for the current period. To address this concern, my second hypothesis is
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based on the average performance of the previous two years. More importantly, long
term incentive awards in compensation contracts are usually earned over a three to five
year period. Allegion Inc. (2014) states, for example, that “Performance Share Program is
earned over a 3 year performance period. Equity earned is based on our EPS growth
(from continuing operations) relative to companies in the S&P 500 Industrials Index”. In
this case, relative average performance is used in the decision making process.
My second hypothesize is thus:
H2: If a firm’s average performance over the prior two years is below its peer
group, it will have more income-increasing earnings management in the current year.

Current Performance below Expected Peer Performance
When a firm’s expected current year performance is worse than its peer group, the
firm managers are likely to strive to reach peer performance. I employ analysts’
consensus forecasts as my proxy for expected current year performance. Prior studies
(Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; DeFond and Park 1997; and Elgers, Pfeiffer and Porter
2003) argue that analysts’ forecasts can also be proxies for unmanaged earnings. Since
managers may not know peer firms’ earnings at the time they make real earnings or
accruals decisions, they are likely to rely on analysts’ forecasts of peer firm performance.
Managers are thus likely to manage earnings upward when faced with the potential
underperformance relative to their peers. Formally, I hypothesize that:
H3: If a firm’s expected performance is below its peer group’s expected
performance, it is likely to engage in income-increasing earnings management in the
current year.
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First Three Quarters’ Cumulative Performance below Peer Performance
Prior accounting research suggests that firms have greater incentives to manage
earnings in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year because managers are likely to have a
good sense of where they stand vis-à-vis annual targets (Dechow and Shakespeare 2009).
Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) state that managers are unlikely to be evaluated based on
earnings for interim periods and, thus, they have weaker incentives to manage the first
three quarters of a fiscal year’s earnings. Kerstein and Rai (2007) show that a high
proportion of firms with small cumulative profits or losses at the beginning of the fourth
quarter report small annual profits rather than small annual losses. The fourth quarter
represents a manager’s last opportunity to manage earnings, and it also provides
managers the latest earnings information upon which to base their earnings management
targets. Thus, I hypothesize that if firms’ cumulative performance in the first three
quarters of their fiscal year is below its peer group, they will have greater incentives to
manage earnings upward. Stated formally, my hypothesis is:
H4: Firm’s with cumulative performance lower than its peer group through the
first three quarters of the fiscal year will exhibit more upward earnings management in
the fourth quarter of their fiscal year.

Restatements in Firms Managing Earnings to Achieve Peer Performance
Prior studies suggest that there is a positive relation between accounting accruals
and the likelihood of restatements. Richardson, Tuna, and Wu (2002) provide evidence
that restatement firms have high levels of accruals in the years of alleged manipulation.
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Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman (2006) provide complementary support for the
positive relation between the level of accruals and the propensity to restate by
demonstrating that short sellers accumulate positions in restatement firms several months
in advance of the restatement announcement, and the increase in short interest is larger
for firms with high levels of accruals prior to restatements. Hennes, Leone, and Miller
(2008) stress the importance of separating errors from irregularities in misreporting, as
earnings management is the major cause of restatements caused by irregularity. On the
other hand, Ettredge, Scholz, Smith, and Sun (2010) argue that some errors, appearing to
be unintentional, are the result of earnings management. They find that firms with
apparently non-fraudulent errors show a systematic accumulation of income-increasing
accounting choices leading to the restatement period. When within-GAAP earnings
management options have been exhausted, companies can choose to either miss earnings
targets (Barton and Simko 2002) 3, or resort to the most egregious form of earnings
management—non-GAAP earnings management. Thus, firms with higher incentives to
achieve peer performance are more likely to turn to non-GAAP earnings management as
a last resort. I hypothesize that firms that are under pressure to achieve peer performance
benchmarks will be subject to subsequent restatements. Thus, my next set of hypotheses
are:
H5A: If firm’s prior year’s performance is lower than its peer group, its current
year’s earnings are more likely to be restated in the future.

3

Barton and Simko (2002) show that companies with constrained balance sheets are more likely to miss
earnings targets.
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H5B: If firm’s average performance of the past two years is lower than its peer
group, its current year’s earnings are more likely to be restated in the future.
H5C: If firm’s expected performance is below its peer group’s expected
performance, its earnings are more likely to be restated in the future.
H5D: If firm’s cumulative performance of first three quarters is below its peer
group, its earnings are more likely to be restated in the future.

IV. RESEARCH DESIGN
This section describes the research design that I employ in investigating whether
firms manage earnings to achieve peer performance. My research design includes
methods of identifying peer groups for each firm, multivariate regression models used in
testing the hypotheses, and methods of measuring dependent variables, variables of
interest, and control variables.

Peer Group Formulation
Prior studies use different approaches to identify peer groups for RPE, and
empirical findings relating to RPE vary across the studies depending on the approaches
used to identify peer firms in those studies (Gibbons and Murphy 1990; Baker 2002).
Given the lack of consensus on one best approach, I follow Albuquerque 2009 in
identifying peer groups.
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The peer group is constructed based on the two-digit standard industry
classification code (SIC) and firm size quartile within the two-digit SIC level. First,
within an industry (two-digit SIC), firms are sorted by beginning-of-year market value to
form size quartiles. Second, each firm is matched with an industry-size quartile peer
group excluding the firm. Third, the median of performance, measured as return on assets
(ROA) in each peer group, is identified as peer performance.

Multivariate Regression Model
To test my hypotheses, I use the following base model that includes fundamental
factors, such as size, growth, leverage, and performance, that are known to explain
earnings management decisions, and a binary variable: !"##, that equals one if the firm’s
historical performance or current estimated performance is below that of its peer group.
$! = &' + &) !"## + *+,-.+/ 12."23/4# + 5,67899"4# + :42.7899"4# + ;<=
(1)
Discretionary Accruals Measure as Dependent Variable
I use two proxies for discretionary accruals, abnormal total accruals (>?>) and
abnormal current accruals (>*>). The first proxy ATA is the firm-specific residuals
derived from the following equation (2) estimated cross-sectionally for each industryyear combination. Equation (2) is a version of the Modified Jones Model augmented with
lagged ROA as an additional explanatory variable following Kothari, Leone, and Wasley
(2005).
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(2)
TA is total accruals measured as the difference between income before
extraordinary items and cash flows from operations excluding cash flows from
extraordinary items and discontinued operations. ∆P$1<= is change in revenues from year
t-1 to year t for firm i. ∆P$*<= is the change in receivables from year t-1 to year t for firm
i. SS$<= is gross property plant and equipment of firm i for year t. PQ>=R) is the return
on assets of firm i for year t-1. ><=R) is total assets of firm i for year t-1;
Prior studies (Guenther 1994; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998; Bradshaw,
Richardson, and Sloan 2001; Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 2003) suggest that current
accruals are subject to more managerial discretion compared to long-term accruals that
include depreciation, depletion and amortization expenses. Thus, for the empirical tests, I
also employ abnormal current accruals (ACA) defined as the firm specific residuals from
equation (3) estimated cross-sectionally for each year-industry combination. Equation (3)
is another version of the Modified Jones Model using current accruals as the dependent
variable and dropping PPE from the right-hand side following Ashbaugh et al. (2003).
Consistent with equation (2), I also include lagged ROA as an additional explanatory
variable in the model.
MABC
ABCDE

= F' + F)

)
ABCDE

+ FG

∆IJKBC
ABCDE

−

∆IJMBC
ABCDE

(3)
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+ PQ>=R) + ;<=

CA is current accruals of firm i for year t, measured as the total accruals (TA) plus
depreciation and amortization expenses. All other variables are defined in the same
manner as equation (3).
Real Earnings Management Measure as Dependent Variable
I employ unexpected abnormal levels of discretionary expenditures (rmUDISX<= )
and abnormal levels of cash flow from operations (rmCASH<= ) as a proxy for abnormal
levels of real earnings management. Following Zang (2012), I first estimate the abnormal
level of discretionary expenditures (rmDISX<= ) as the residuals from the regression (4)
below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each year and each two-digit SIC
code with at least ten observations, following Roychowdhury (2006):.
^_`aBC
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(4)
Where,
DISX<= : firm i’s discretionary expenditures defined as the sum of R&D,
advertising, and SG&A expenditures in year t;
e<= : firm i’s revenue at year t;
><=R) : total asset of firm i for year t-1.
After finding the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures ( rmDISX<= ), I
estimate the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmUDISX<= ) as the
residuals from the regression of equation (6) below. The regression is estimated crosssectionally for industry-years using two-digit sic codes.
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rmDISX<= = f' + f) !2.g4-chijk <=R) + fG le*QP$<=R) + fN ?>mIi=k <= + fn o5p8<= +
fr sQ><=R) + ft *:*u$<=R) + fv PQ><= + fw u+x>?<= + fy !-+o<= + f)' $2.,<= + ;<=
(5)
Where,
!2.g4-_eℎ2.4<=R) : the percentage of the company’s sales to the total sales of its
industry at the beginning of year t, where industry is defined based on three-digit
SIC code;
le*QP$<=R) : z-score at the beginning of the year t. le*QP$<= is computed using
the following equation, following modified version of Altman’s Z-score (Altman
1968, 2000);
le*QP$<= = 0.3

s5<=
e2/4#<=
P4-2",46 $2.,",x#<=
+ 1.0
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>##4-<=
>##4-<=
>##4-<=
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+ 0.6(

e-+Üg S."Ü4 ∗ eℎ2.4# Q8-#-2,6",x<=
)
?+-2/ /"23"/"-"4#<=

?>m_P2-4<= : income tax expense divided by pre-tax income at year t4;
o5p8<= : indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 4
and historically big 8, and 0 otherwise;
sQ><=R) : indicator variable that equals 1 if the net operating assets, i.e.
shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable securities and plus total debt, at the

4

In Zang(2012), marginal tax rate developed and provided by Professor John Graham was used, because of
the lack of accessibility of the marginal tax rate data, I calculate the tax rate in the above form using
Compustat database.
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beginning of the year divided by lagged sales is above the median of the
corresponding industry-year, and 0 otherwise;
*:*u$<=R) : days receivable plus the days inventory less the days payable at the
beginning of the year, scaled by the number of the days in the year t-1;
PQ><= : return on assets, computed using income before extraordinary items
divided by the average of assets in year t and assets in year t-1;
u+x>?<= : natural logarithm of assets at year t;
!-+o<= : market to book ratio;
$2.,<= : earnings before extraordinary items scaled by previous year’s assets
minus aa<= , the measure of discretionary accruals, and subtracting rmDISX<= , the
negative value of discretionary expenditures.
To be consistent with Zang (2012), the unexpected abnormal level of
discretionary expenditures ( rmUDISX<= ) i.e., the residuals from regression (b), are
multiplied by (-1) such that higher values indicate greater amounts of unexpected
abnormal levels of discretionary expenditures.
Following Roychowdhury (2006), I estimate normal cash flow from operations as
a linear function of sales and change in sales in the current period. To estimate the model,
I run the following cross-sectional regression for every industry and year:
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(6)
where >?= is the total assetss at the end of period t, e= the sales during period t and ∆e= =
e= − e=R) . For every firm-year, abnormal cash flow from operations is the actual CFO
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minus the “normal” CFO calculated using estimated coefficients from the corresponding
industry-year model and the corresponding industry-year model and the firm-year’s sales
and lagged assets.
Variables of Interest
The variable of interest is !"##, a binary variable that equals one if the firm’s
historical performance or current estimated performance is below that of its peer group.
For regressions related to each hypothesis, !"## is calculated differently to match with
the related hypothesis. In H1, !"## equals one if firm i’s prior year’s performance
(PQ>=R) ) is below that of its peer group. In H2, !"## equals one if firm i’s average
performance (PQ>å
PQ>å

=R),=RG

=R),=RG

) of the past two years is below that of its peer group.

is calculated using

IãACDé èIãACDE
G

. In H3, !"## equals one if firm i’s

expected performance ê+.4Ü2#-46_$Se= at year t is below its peer group’s expected
performance for year t. Firm i’s expected performance ê+.4Ü2#-46_$Se= is calculated
using analysts’ consensus forecasted EPS scaled by scaled by assets per share at the
beginning of the fiscal year. Assets per share is calculated using assets divided by
common shares used to calculate earnings per share. Consensus analyst forecasted EPS
are the mean analysts’ forecasts for the next period. If the same analyst revised the
previous forecast, I use the most recent revised forecast.
Control Variables
Following Zang (2012), I include the following variables to control for systematic
variation in levels of earnings management related to firm size, growth opportunities,
leverage, and current period firm performance. LogAT<= is the natural logarithm of total
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assets of firm i for year t. BM<= is the book value of equity divided by market value of
equity in year t for firm i. ROA<= is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. u$1<= is total
liabilities divided by total assets in year t.
I follow Brown and Caylor (2005) in defining three earnings thresholds—
avoiding losses, avoiding earnings declines and avoiding negative earnings surprises.
First, firms are considered to avoid losses when income before extraordinary items in
year t is equal to or greater than zero. Second, firms are considered to avoid earnings
declines when income before extraordinary items in year t is equal to or greater than
income before extraordinary items in year t-1. Third, firms are considered to avoid
negative earnings surprises when actual annual earnings per share are equal to or greater
than the annual earnings per share forecast. ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61 is an indicator variable equal to
1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is defined as income before
extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of [0.02].
?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a
small margin, which is defined as the change in income before extraordinary items from
year t-1 to year t, scaled by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01].
?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids negative earnings
surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises scaled by beginning
price per share within the range of [0.0025]
For specific analyses, the control variables vary due to different research designs.
For each regression, I also control for industry and year fixed effects.
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Specific Model for Hypotheses Testing
Model for H1
First, I begin with testing whether firms achieving peer performance benchmarks
are associated with higher abnormal accruals. To test this conjecture, I modify the base
model using an indicator variable for firm-years achieving the peer performance
benchmark after controlling for other known earnings benchmarks and other extraneous
variables. The empirical model for this test specified as follows:
7><= = &' + &) >Üℎ"4ô4<= + &G u+x>?<= + &N o!<= + &n u$1<= + &r PQ><= + &t 7><=R) +
&v ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<= + &w ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<= + &y ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<= +
õ &)),õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=

ö &)',ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=

+

+ ;<=

(7)
Second, I test whether firms missing the prior year’s peer performance
benchmarks are associated with a higher level of abnormal accruals in the current year.
To test this conjecture, I modify the base model using an indicator variable for firm-years
missing the prior year’s peer performance benchmark after controlling for other known
earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables. The empirical model for this test
specified as follows:
7><= = &' + &) !"##<=R) + &G u+x>?<= + &N o!<= + &n u$1<= + &r PQ><= + &t 7><=R) +
&v ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<= + &w ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<= + &y ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<= +
õ &)),õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=

+ ;<=

(8)
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+

Third, I test the joint effect of achieving the current year’s peer performance
benchmark and missing the prior year’s peer performance benchmark on accruals
management. To test this conjecture, I modify the base model using an interaction term of
firms achieving the current year’s peer performance benchmark and firms
underperforming compared to the prior year’s peer performance after controlling for
other known earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables. The empirical model
for this test specified as follows:
DA<= = &' + &) >Üℎ"4ô4<= + &G ú,S4.ù<=R) + &N >Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ ú,S4.ù<=R) +
&n u+x>?<= + &r o!<= + &t 7><=R) + &v u$1<= + &w PQ><= + &y ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<= +
&)' ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<= + &)) ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<= + +
õ &)N,õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=

ö &)G,ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=

+

+ ;<=

(9)
Fourth, I test whether firms achieving peer performance benchmarks are
associated with higher levels of real activities manipulation. To test this conjecture, I
modify the base model using an indicator variable for firm-years achieving the peer
performance benchmark after controlling for other known earnings benchmarks and other
extraneous variables. The empirical model for this test specified as follows:
P!<= = &' + &) >Üℎ"4ô4<= + &G LogAT<= + &N BM<= + &n u$1<= + &r ROA<= +
&t ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<= + &v ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<= + &w ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<= + &y >?><= +
ö &)',ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=

+

õ &)),õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=

(10)
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+ ;<=

Fifth, I test whether firms missing the prior year’s peer performance benchmarks
are associated with higher levels of real activities manipulation in the current year. To
test this conjecture, I modify the base model using an indicator variable for firm-years
missing the prior year’s peer performance benchmark after controlling for other known
earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables. The empirical model for this test
specified as follows:
P!<= = &' + &) !"##<=R) + &G LogAT<= + &N BM<= + &n u$1<= + &r ROA<= +
&t ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<= + &v ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<= + &w ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<= + &y >?><= +
ö &)',ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=

+

õ &)),õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=

+ ;<=

(11)
Sixth, I test the joint effect of achieving the current year’s peer performance
benchmark and underperforming compared to the prior year’s peer performance on the
real activities manipulation. To test this conjecture, I modify the base model using an
interaction term for achieving the current year’s peer performance benchmark and
underperforming compared to prior year’s peer performance after controlling for other
known earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables. The empirical model for this
test specified as follows:
RM<= = &' + &) >Üℎ"4ô4<= + &G ú,S4.ù<=R) + &N >Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ ú,S4.ù<=R) +
&n u+x>?<= + &r o!<= + &t u$1<= + &v PQ><= + &w ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<= + &y ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<= +
&)' ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<= + &)) >?><= +
õ &)N,õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=

ö &)G,ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=

+ ;<=

(12)
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All the variables have been explained above. The control variables are different
between the regressions of discretionary accruals and real earnings management. In the
models (7), (8), (9), I controlled for prior year’s discretionary accruals because Allen et
al. (2013) document pervasive evidence of reversals in firm-level accruals over adjacent
fiscal years. In the models (10), (11), (12), I control for the current year’s total accruals
because Zang (2012) finds that managers trade off the two earnings management methods
based on their relative costs.
Model for H2
First, I test whether firms missing the prior two year’s mean peer performance
benchmarks are associated with a higher level of abnormal accruals in the current year.
To test this conjecture, I modify the base model using an indicator variable for firm-years
missing the prior two year’s mean peer performance benchmark after controlling for
other known earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables. The empirical model
for this test specified as follows:
7><= = &' + &) !"##<å(=R),=RG) + &G LogAT<= + &N BM<= + &n u$1<= + &r ROA<= +
&t 7><=R) + &v ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<= + &w ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<= + &y ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<= +
ö &)',ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=

+

õ &)),õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=

+ ;<=

(13)
Second, I test the joint effect of achieving the current year’s peer performance
benchmark and missing the prior two year’s mean peer performance benchmark on
accruals management. To test this conjecture, I modify the base model using an
interaction term for achieving the current year’s peer performance benchmark and
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underperforming compared to the prior two year’s mean peer performance after
controlling for other known earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables. The
empirical model for this test specified as follows:
7><= = &' + &) >Üℎ"4ô4<= + &G ú,S4.ù<å(=R),=RG) + &N >Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ ú,S4.ù<å(=R),=RG) +
&n LogAT<= + &r BM<= + &t u$1<= + &v ROA<= + &w 7><=R) + &y ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<= +
&)' ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<= + &)) ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<= +
õ &)N,õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=

ö &)G,ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=

+

+ ;<=

(14)
Third, I test whether firms missing the prior two year’s mean peer performance
benchmarks are associated with higher levels of real activities manipulation in the current
year. To test this conjecture, I modify the base model using an indicator variable for firmyears missing the prior two year’s mean peer performance benchmark after controlling
for other known earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables. The empirical
model for this test specified as follows:
RM<= = &' + &) !"##<å(=R),=RG) + &G LogAT<= + &N BM<= + &n u$1<= + &r ROA<= +
&t ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<= + &v ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<= + &w ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<= + &y >?><= +
ö &)',ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=

+

õ &)),õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=

+ ;<=

(15)
Fourth, I test the joint effect of achieving the current year’s peer performance
benchmark and missing the prior two year’s mean peer performance benchmark on real
activities manipulation. To test this conjecture, I modify the base model using an
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interaction term for achieving the current year’s peer performance benchmark and
missing the prior two year’s mean peer performance benchmark after controlling for
other known earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables. The empirical model
for this test specified as follows:
RM<= = &' + &) >Üℎ"4ô4<= + &G ú,S4.ù<å(=R),=RG) + &N >Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ ú,S4.ù<å(=R),=RG) +
&n LogAT<= + &r BM<= + &t u$1<= + &v ROA<= + &w ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<= + &y ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<= +
&)' ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<= + &)) >?><= +
õ &)N,õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=

ö &)G,ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=

+

+ ;<=

(16)
All the variables have been explained above.
Model for H3
First, I test whether firms missing the expected peer performance benchmarks are
associated with a higher level of abnormal accruals in the current year. To test this
conjecture, I modify the base model using an indicator variable for firm-years missing the
current year’s expected peer performance benchmarks after controlling for other known
earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables. The empirical model for this test
specified as follows:
7><= = &' + &) $!"##<= + &G LogAT<= + &N BM<= + &n u$1<= + &r ROA<= + &t 7><=R) +
&v ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<= + &w ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<= + &y ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<= +
õ &)),õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=

+ ;<=

(17)
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Second, I test the joint effect of achieving the current year’s peer performance
benchmark and missing the current year’s expected peer performance benchmark on
accruals management. To test this conjecture, I modify the base model using an
interaction term for achieving the current year’s peer performance benchmark and
underperforming the current year’s expected peer performance after controlling for other
known earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables. The empirical model for this
test specified as follows:
7><= = &' + &) >Üℎ"4ô4<= + &G $ú,S4.ù<= + &N >Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ $ú,S4.ù<= + &n LogAT<= +
&r BM<= + &t u$1<= + &v ROA<= + &w 7><=R) + &y ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<= + &)' ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<= +
&)) ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<= +

ö &)G,ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=

+

õ &)N,õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=

+ ;<=

(18)
Third, I test whether firms missing the expected peer performance benchmarks are
associated with a higher level of real activities manipulation in the current year. To test
this conjecture, I modify the base model using an indicator variable for firm-years
missing the current year’s expected peer performance benchmarks after controlling for
other known earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables. The empirical model
for this test specified as follows:
P!<= = &' + &) $!"##<= + &G LogAT<= + &N BM<= + &n u$1<= + &r ROA<= +
&t ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<= + &v ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<= + &w ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<= + &y >?><= +
ö &)',ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=

+

õ &)),õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=

(19)
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Fourth, I test the joint effect of achieving the current year’s peer performance
benchmark and missing the current year’s expected peer performance benchmark on real
activities manipulation. To test this conjecture, I modify the base model using an
interaction term for achieving the current year’s peer performance benchmark and
underperforming the current year’s expected peer performance after controlling for other
known earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables. The empirical model for this
test specified as follows:
rmUDISX<= = &' + &) >Üℎ"4ô4<= + &G $ú,S4.ù<= + &N >Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ $ú,S4.ù<= +
&n LogAT<= + &r BM<= + &t u$1<= + &v ROA<= + &w ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<= + &y ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<= +
&)' ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<= + &)) >?><= +
õ &)N,õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=

ö &)G,ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=

+ ;<=

+

(20)

All the variables have been explained above.
Model for H4:
First, I test whether firms missing the first three quarter’s cumulative peer
performance benchmarks are associated with a higher level of abnormal accruals in the
fourth quarter. I modify the base model using an indicator variable for firm-years missing
the first three quarter’s cumulative peer performance benchmark.
7><=(ûn) = &' + &) !"##<=
&r ROA<=(ûn) + &t 7><=

û),ûG,ûN

û),ûG,ûN

+ &G LogAT<=(ûn) + &N BM<=(ûn) + &n u$1<=(ûn) +

+. + &v ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<=(ûn) + &w ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<=(ûn) +

&y ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<=(ûn) + 5,67899"4# + :42.7899"4# + ;<=
(21)
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Second, I test the joint effect of achieving the current year’s peer performance
benchmark and missing the first three quarter’s cumulative peer performance benchmark
on accruals management for the fourth quarter. To test this conjecture, I modify the base
model using an interaction term for achieving the current year’s peer performance
benchmark and underperforming the first three quarter’s cumulative peer performance
after controlling for other known earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables.
The empirical model for this test specified as follows:
7><=(ûn) = &' + &) >Üℎ"4ô4<= + &G ú,S4.ù<=
ú,S4.ù<=
&w 7><=

û),ûG,ûN

+ &n LogAT<=

ûn

+ &y ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<=

û),ûG,ûN

&)) ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<=

ûn

+

+ &r BM<=
ûn

+ &N >Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗

û),ûG,ûN
ûn

+ &t u$1<=

+ &)' ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<=

ö &)G,ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=(ûn)

õ &)N,õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=(ûn)

+ ;<=

ûn
ûn

+ &v ROA<=

ûn

+

+

+

(22)

Third, I test whether firms missing the first three quarter’s cumulative peer
performance benchmarks are associated with a higher level of abnormal accruals in the
fourth quarter. To test this conjecture, I modify the base model using an indicator variable
for firm-years missing the first three quarter’s cumulative peer performance benchmark.
RM<=(ûn) = &' + &) !"##<=

û),ûG,ûN

+ &G LogAT<=(ûn) + &N BM<=(ûn) + &n u$1<=(ûn) +

&r ROA<=(ûn) + &t ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<=(ûn) + &v ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<=(ûn) + &w ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<=(ûn) +
&y >?><=(ûn) +

ö &)',ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=(ûn)

(23)
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õ &)),õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=(ûn)
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Fourth, I test the joint effect of achieving the current year’s peer performance
benchmark and missing the first three quarter’s cumulative peer performance benchmark
on real earnings manipulation of the fourth quarter. To test this conjecture, I modify the
base model using an interaction term for achieving the current year’s peer performance
benchmark and underperforming the first three quarter’s cumulative peer performance
after controlling for other known earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables.
The empirical model for this test specified as follows:
rmUDISX<=

ûn

= &' + &) >Üℎ"4ô4<= + &G ú,S4.ù<=

ú,S4.ù<=

û),ûG,ûN

û),ûG,ûN

+ &N >Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗

+ &n LogAT<=(ûn) + &r BM<=(ûn) + &t u$1<=(ûn) + &v ROA<=(ûn) +

&w ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<=(ûn) + &y ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<=(ûn) + &)' ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<=(ûn) + &)) >?><=(ûn) +
ö &)G,ö 5,67899"4#ö,<=(ûn)

+

õ &)N,õ :42.7899"4#õ,<=(ûn)

+ ;<=

(24)
Where,
>Üℎ"4ô4<= is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s current year’s
performance (PQ>= ) is above the peer group by a certain range.
ú,S4.ù<=
(PQ>

û),ûG,ûN

û),ûG,ûN

: equals one if firm i’s cumulative performance

) of the first three quarters in year t is below that of its peer group

by a certain range.
PQ>

û),ûG,ûN

is calculated using income before extraordinary items in quarter 1,

add that in quarter 2, quarter 3, then use the cumulative number divided by
average of assets at the beginning of quarter 1 and the end of quarter 3;
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7><=(ûn) : firm i’s discretionary accrual at the fourth quarter in year t. There are
two measures for discretionary accrual: >?><=(ûn) , which is the abnormal total
accrual at the fourth quarter in year t, and >*><=(ûn) , which is the abnormal
working capital accrual at the fourth quarter in year t. They are calculated using
equation (3) and equation (4), respectively.
RM<=(ûn) : firm i’s level of real earnings management at the fouth quarter in year t.
There are two measures for real earnings management: rmUDISX<=(ûn) , which is
the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures at the fourth quarter
in year t. rmCash<=(ûn) , which is the abnormal cash flow from operations at the
fourth quarter in year t.
LogAT<=(ûn) : natural logarithm of asset at fourth quarter of firm i for year t;
BM<=(ûn) : book value of equity divided by market value of equity at fourth
quarter of year t for firm i;
u$1<=(ûn) : total liability divided by total assets at fourth quarter of year t;
ROA<=(ûn) : income before extraordinary items at fourth quarter of year in year t
divided;
by the average of total assets of the fourth quarter and beginning of fourth quarter
in year t;
7><=

û),ûG,ûN

: firm i’s discretionary accrual at the first three quarters of year t.

There are two measures for discretionary accrual: >?><=

û),ûG,ûN

, which is the

abnormal total accrual of the first three quarters at year t, and >*><=
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û),ûG,ûN

,

which is abnormal working capital accrual of the first three quarters at year t.
They are calculated using equation (3) and equation (4), respectively.
?ℎ.4#ℎ+/61<=

ûn

, ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/62<=(ûn) and ?ℎ.4#ℎ+/63<=(ûn) : equals one if firm i

just meet and beat threshold 1, threshold2 or threshold 3 in the fourth quarter of
year t. respectively. The definition of just meet and beat each threshold is
explained in the previous section.
Model for H5
In this section, I use the logistic models to test whether achieving or missing the
peer performance benchmark has an impact on the probability of misreporting. First, I
test the joint effect of firms achieving current year’s peer performance benchmark and
abnormal accruals. To test this conjecture, I use the interaction term for achieving the
current year’s peer performance benchmark and the current year’s abnormal accruals and
control for other known earnings benchmarks and other extraneous variables. The
empirical model for this test specified as follows:
Pr (P$e?>?$!$s?_S$P5Q7<= = 1) = ê(&' + &) >Üℎ"4ô4<= + &) 7><= + >Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗
7><= + *+,-.+/ 12."23/4# + 5,67899"4# + :42.7899"4# + ;<= )
(25)
Second, I test the joint effect of firms achieving the current and missing the prior
peer performance benchmarks, and abnormal accruals. To test this conjecture, I use the
interaction term of the dummy variable indicating achieving current and missing prior
peer performance benchmark, and the continuous variable, current year’s abnormal
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accruals, and control for other known earnings benchmarks and other extraneous
variables. The empirical model for this test specified as follows:
Pr (P$e?>?$!$s?_S$P5Q7<= = 1) = ê(&' + &) >Üℎ"4ô4_!"## + &G 7><= +
&N >Üℎ"4ô4_!"## ∗ 7><= + *+,-.+/ 12."23/4# + 5,67899"4# + :42.7899"4# +
;<= )
(26)
Third, I test whether missing the prior peer performance benchmarks increases the
probability of misreporting. To test this conjecture, I use the dummy variable for firms
missing the prior peer performance benchmarks and control for other known earnings
benchmarks and other extraneous variables. The empirical model for this test specified as
follows:
Pr (P$e?>?$!$s?_S$P5Q7<= = 1) = ê(&' + &) !"## + *+,-.+/ 12."23/4# +
5,67899"4# + :42.7899"4# + ;<= )
(27)
P4#-2-494,-_S4."+6<= is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is among the
misstatement years. For example, let’s say firm i managed earnings in 2002 and 2003.
Firm i is included for firm-year 2002 and 2003 (coded as P4#-2-494,-_S4."+6<= =1). On
Audit Analytics where restatement data is provided, the earliest restatement
announcement is in year 2000. So the data when I use this regression model starts from
year 2002.
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V. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION
This study uses four samples. My first sample is obtained from the Compustat
fundamental annual file and I/B/E/S detail file for the period 1988 through 2012.
Although my sample period begins in 1988, as I require three years of financial
information in calculating the previous two years’ ROA, my empirical tests are thus
based on the sample period 1991 through 2012. Following prior studies, I delete all
financial institutions (SIC codes: 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes: 4400-5000).
Because certain variables are scaled by previous year’s total assets, firm years with total
assets less than $1 million in fiscal year t-1 are deleted. As I estimate abnormal total
accruals (ATA), abnormal current accruals (ACA), the unexpected abnormal level of
discretionary expenditures (rmUDISX<= ) and the abnormal cash flow from operations
(rmCASH<= ) for each year-industry combination, I delete the industries (i.e., two-digit
SIC code) with less than ten firm years in a given fiscal year. All variables except for the
indicator variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
The second sample is obtained from the Compustat fundamental quarterly file and
I/B/E/S detail file for 1988 through 2012. I require five quarters of information in
estimating certain variables such as abnormal accruals of the previous three quarters, thus
my empirical tests are based on a sample period of 1990 through 2012. Following prior
studies, I delete all firms in the financial services (SIC codes: 6000-6999) and utilities
(SIC codes: 4400-5000) industries. As I estimate abnormal total accruals (ATA),
abnormal current accruals (ACA), the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary
expenditures ( rmCASH<= ) and the abnormal cash flow( rmCASH<= )
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for each fourth

quarter-industry combination, I delete the industries (i.e., two-digit SIC code) with less
than ten firm-years in a given fourth quarter. Since the model is built to observe fourth
quarter earnings management, the final sample contains only fourth quarter data for each
year.
The third sample is obtained from Compustat fundamental annual file, I/B/E/S
detail file and the Audit Analytics file for 2000 through 2012. The sample derivation
follows the same steps as the first sample. Then I merge those observations with the
Audit Analytics file, and I delete the fiscal year before 2000 because the earliest
restatement announcement is in year 2000.
The fourth sample is obtained from the Compustat fundamental quarterly file,
I/B/E/S detailed file and the Audit Analytics file for 2000 through 2012. The sample
derivation follows the same steps as the second sample. Then I merge those observations
with the Audit Analytics file, I delete the fiscal year before 2000 because the earliest
restatement announcement is in year 2000.
Table 1 provides the sample derivation for empirical analyses of discretionary
accruals measures—abnormal total accruals (AA) and abnormal current accruals (AWCA),
real earnings management measures—the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures
(rmUDISX) and the abnormal cash flow from operations (rmCASH), and restatement
( P$e?>?$!$s?_S$P5Q7 ). The Compustat annual file has 116,635 firm-year
observation from 1988-2012. After the steps described above, there are 47,968 firm-year
observations with discretionary accrual measures and 46,930 firm-year observations with
real earnings management measures. After I merge them with restatement data, I delete
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the firm-year before fiscal year 2000 and 29,604 firm-year observations are used for
analyses with restatement. The Compustat quarterly file has 167,982 firm-quarter
observation from 1988-2012. After the steps described above, there are 29,589 firmfourth-quarter observations with discretionary accruals measures and 25,779 firm-fourthquarter with real earnings management measures. After I merge them with restatement
data, I delete the observations before fiscal year 2000 and 146,82 firm-quarter
observations are used for analyses with restatement.

VI.EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the firms missing the historical and
current peer performance benchmarks, the abnormal total accruals, abnormal current
accruals, the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures, abnormal cash
flows from operations, and the control variables. The mean and median are consistent
with previous research (Roychowdury 2006; Zang 2012). The mean value of abnormal
total accruals is -0.0176. The mean value of abnormal current accruals is -0.0132. The
mean value of the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures is 0.0028. The value of
abnormal cash flows from operations is 0.0263.
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Correlation
Table 3 provides the correlations among various variables. Upper diagonal cells
are Pearson correlations and lower diagonal cells are Spearman correlations. There are
high negative correlations among the accruals management measures—abnormal total
accruals, abnormal current accruals, and real earnings management measures—
unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures, abnormal cash flow from
operations. There could be two explanations. One is the correlation is mechanical because
one variable is used in the calculations of the other variables. For example, abnormal total
accruals are used in the calculation of unexpected abnormal level of discretionary
expenditures. The other reason is the trade-off between real activities manipulation and
accrual-based earnings management (Zang 2012).

Multiple Regression Analyses
This section provides the empirical results of firms missing the historical and
current peer performance benchmarks.
Missing Prior Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
Tables 4 through 9 provide evidence supporting H1. First, I estimate equation (7-9)
by using two proxies for accrual management as dependent variables: (a) abnormal total
accruals, (b) abnormal current accruals. Second, I estimate equation (9-12) by using two
proxies for real earnings manipulation as dependent variables: (a) unexpected abnormal
level of discretionary expenditures, (b) abnormal cash flow from operations.
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Accruals Management Tests
Table 4 provides the regression results of equation (7). For both measures, the
coefficients on the variable of interest >Üℎ"4ô4<= is positive and significant, suggesting
that those firm with return on assets (ROA) just above their peer group (achieve within
the range of 0.05) in the current year exhibit greater income-increasing abnormal
accruals. Firms just achieved current year’s peer performance benchmark have higher
abnormal accruals compared to the rest of the sample provide evidence that firms use
discretionary accruals to boost earnings to achieve the peer performance benchmark.
Table 5 provides the regression results of equation (8). For both measures, the
coefficients on the variable of interest !"##<=R) is positive and significant, suggesting that
firms with prior year performance that is below that of their peer group will exhibit
greater levels of income-increasing accruals management in current year earnings. When
the dependent variable is abnormal total accruals, the coefficient on !"##<=R) is positive
(0.0442) and significant at the 1% level (p<0.0001). Those firm years have abnormal total
accruals that are higher on average by 4.42% of assets compared to the rest of the sample.
When the dependent variable is abnormal current accruals, the coefficient on !"##<=R) is
positive (0.0386) and significant at the 1% level (p<0.0001). Those firm years have
abnormal current accruals that are higher on average by 3.86% of assets compared to the
rest of the sample.
The coefficients for the control variables are consistent with prior studies. The
coefficient on LEV is positive and significant, indicating that firms with higher leverage
are more likely to have higher abnormal accruals. The coefficient on SIZE is negative and
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significant since larger firms tend to have lower abnormal accruals. The coefficient on
BM is positive and significant. For the long-term earnings growth, although McNichols
(2000) conjectured that firms with greater expected earnings growth are likely to have
greater accruals than firms with less expected earnings growth, I observe the opposite
sign. One explanation is that the relation between expected earnings growth and
abnormal accruals is not linear. (Collins 2012). The coefficient on ROA is positive and
significant. Although I control for the level of firm performance when calculating the
accruals management measures, this discretionary accruals model is still misspecificed
when applied to samples of firms with extreme performance in part because performance
(Kothari et al. 2005). One thing worth noticing is the positive and significant correlation
between the prior year’s abnormal accrual and the current year’s abnormal accruals.
Although accruals reverse at the individual transaction level, they need not reverse at the
firm level since the new originating accruals can offset old reversing accruals. Allen et al.
(2013) finds the reversals in firm-level accruals over adjacent fiscal years. Accruals
related to firm growth are positively serially correlated. Accruals related to temporary
fluctuations in working capital, such as a firm may temporarily accelerate normal
inventory purchases, is negatively serially correlated. Thus, one explanation for the
negative correlation in my test is that discretionary accruals measurements are not clean
measurements that rule out that accruals are related to firm growth.
Table 6 provides the regression results of equation (9). The interaction term
>Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ ú,S4.ù<=R) , captures the incremental effect on accruals management of
firms both just achieving ( achieve within the range of 0.05) current year’s peer
performance benchmark and just missing (miss within the range of -0.05) last year’s peer
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performance benchmark, is positive and significant, indicating those firms are more
likely to manage accruals in the current year.
Real Activities Manipulation Tests
Table 7 provides the regression results of equation (10). The coefficient on
>Üℎ"4ô4<= is not significant when .9ú75em<= is the dependent variable, yet the
coefficient is significant when .9ú75em<= is the proxy for real activities manipulation.
My expectation that firms just achieve their peer performance benchmark would have
higher level of real earnings management in the current year is not supported.
Table 8 provides the regression results of equation (11). For both measures, the
coefficients on the variable of interest !"##<=R) is positive and significant, suggesting that
firms with prior year performance that is below that of their peer group will exhibit
greater levels of income-increasing real activities manipulation in current year earnings.
When the dependent variable is unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures,
the coefficient on !"##<=R) is positive (0.0062) and significant at the 1% level
(p<0.0001). Those firm years have unexpected abnormal level of discretionary
expenditures that are higher on average by 0.62% of assets compared to the rest of the
sample. When the dependent variable is abnormal cash flow from operations, the
coefficient on !"##<=R) is positive (0.0136) and significant at the 1% level (p<0.0001).
Those firm years have abnormal cash flow from operations that are higher on average by
1.36% of assets compared to the rest of the sample.
Table 9 provides the regression results of equation (12). The coefficient on
>Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ ú,S4.ù<=R) is positive and significant regressed on abnormal cash flows,
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indicating firms just achieved ( achieve within the range of 0.05) current year’s peer
performance benchmark and just missed ( miss within the range of -0.05) last year’s peer
performance benchmark have higher abnormal cash flows compared to the rest of the
sample provide evidence that firms use real activities to increase cash to boost earnings to
achieve the peer performance benchmark. However, when the dependent variable is
.9ú75em<= , the coefficient on the interaction term is not significant. So the results
presented in Table 9 are less convincing.
Missing Prior Two Year’s Mean Peer Performance Benchmark
Tables 10 through 13 provide evidence consistent with H2. First, I estimate
equations (13) and (14) using two proxies for accruals management as dependent
variables—(a) abnormal total accruals, (b) abnormal working capital accruals. Second, I
estimate equations (15) and (16) by using two proxies for real activities manipulation as
dependent variables—(a) unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures, (b)
abnormal cash flow from operations.
Accruals Management Tests
Table 10 provides the regression results of equation (13). For both measures, the
coefficients on the variable of interest !"##<å(=R),=RG) is positive and significant,
suggesting that if a firm’s average performance over the prior two years is below that of
its peer group, it will have more income-increasing accruals management in the current
year. When the dependent variable is abnormal total accruals, the coefficient on
!"##<å(=R),=RG) is positive (0.0415) and significant at the 1% level (p<0.0001). Those firm
years have abnormal total accruals that are higher on average by 4.15% of assets
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compared to the rest of the sample. When the dependent variable is abnormal current
accruals, the coefficient on !"##<å(=R),=RG) is positive (0.0373) and significant at the 1%
level (p<0.0001). Those firm years have abnormal current accruals that are higher on
average by 3.73% of assets compared to the rest of the sample.
Table 11 provides the regression results of equation (14). The interaction term
>Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ ú,S4.ù<å(=R),=RG) is positive and significant, indicating that firms both just
achieving (achieve within the range of 0.05) current year’s peer performance benchmark
and just missing (miss within the range of -0.05) prior two year’s mean peer performance
benchmark, are more likely to manage accruals in the current year.
Real Activities Manipulation Tests
Table 12 provides the regression results of equation (15). For both measures, the
coefficients on the variable of interest !"##<å(=R),=RG) is positive and significant,
suggesting that if a firm’s average performance over the prior two years is below that of
its peer group, it will have more income-increasing real activities manipulation in the
current year. When the dependent variable is unexpected abnormal level of discretionary
expenditures, the coefficient on !"##<å(=R),=RG) is positive (0.0042) and significant at the
1% level (p<0.0001). Those firm years have unexpected abnormal level of discretionary
expenditures that are higher on average by 0.42% of assets compared to the rest of the
sample. When the dependent variable is abnormal cash flow from operations, the
coefficient on !"##<å(=R),=RG) is positive (0.0123) and significant at the 1% level
(p<0.0001). Those firm years have abnormal cash flow from operations that are higher on
average by 1.23% of assets compared to the rest of the sample.
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Table 13 provides the regression results of equation (16). The coefficient on
>Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ ú,S4.ù<å(=R),=RG) is positive and significant regressed on abnormal cash
flows, indicating firms just achieving (achieve within the range of 0.05) current year’s
peer performance benchmark and just missing (miss within the range of -0.05) prior two
year’s peer performance benchmark have higher abnormal cash flows compared to the
rest of the sample provide evidence that firms use real activities to increase cash to boost
earnings to achieve the peer performance benchmark. However, when the dependent
variable is .9ú75em<= , the coefficient on the interaction term is not significant.
Missing Current Year’s Expected Peer Performance Benchmark
Tables 14 through 17 provide evidence supporting H3. First, I estimate equations
(17) and (18) using two proxies for accruals management as dependent variables—(a)
abnormal total accruals, (b) abnormal current accruals. Second, I estimate equations (19)
and (20) using two proxies for real activities manipulation as dependent variables—(a)
unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures, (b) abnormal cash flow from
operations.
Accruals Management Tests
Table 14 provides the regression results of equation (17). For both measures, the
coefficients on the variable of interest !"##<= is positive and significant, suggesting that if
a firm’s expected performance is below its peer group’s expected performance, incomeincreasing accruals management will be greater in the current year than if the firm’s
expected performance exceeds that of its peers. When the dependent variable is abnormal
total accruals, the coefficient on $!"##<= is positive (0.0249) and significant at the 1%
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level (p<0.0001). Those firm years have abnormal total accruals that are higher on
average by 2.49% of assets compared to the rest of the sample. When the dependent
variable is abnormal current accruals, the coefficient on $!"##<= is positive (0.0221) and
significant at the 1% level (p<0.0001). Those firm years have abnormal current accruals
that are higher on average by 2.21% of assets compared to the rest of the sample.
Table 15 provides the regression results of equation (18). The coefficients on the
interaction term >Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ $ú,S4.ù<= is positive and significant, indicating that firms
just achieving (achieve within the range of 0.05) current year’s peer performance
benchmark and firms just missing (miss within the range of -0.05) current year’s
expected peer performance benchmark are more likely to manage accruals upward to
achieve the peer performance benchmark.
Real Activities Manipulation Tests
Table 16 provides the regression results of equation (19). For both measures, the
coefficients on the variable of interest !"##<= is not significant. It fails to provide
evidence that if a firm’s expected performance is below its peer group’s expected
performance, income-increasing real activities manipulation will be greater in the current
year than if the firm’s expected performance exceeds that of its peers.
Table 17 provides the regression results of equation (20). When the dependent
variable is abnormal cash flows, the coefficient on the interaction term >Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗
$ú,S4.ù<= , capturing the incremental effect on real activities manipulation of firms that
both just achieve (achieve within the range of 0.05) current year’s peer performance
benchmark and just miss (miss within the range of -0.05) current year’s expected peer
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performance benchmark, is positive and significant, indicating those firms possess higher
abnormal cash flows during the year. However, for the unexpected abnormal level of
discretionary expenditures, the coefficient on the interaction term is not significant.
Missing First Three Quarter’s Cumulative Peer Performance Benchmark
Tables 18 through 21 provide evidence in line with H4. First, I estimate equations
(21) and (22) using two proxies for accruals management as dependent variables— (a)
abnormal total accruals, (b) abnormal current accruals. Second, I estimate equation
(23)(24) using two proxies for real activities manipulation as dependent variables— (a)
unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures, (b) abnormal cash flow from
operations.
Accruals Management Tests
Table 18 provides the regression results of equation (21). For both measures, the
coefficients on the variable of interest !"##<=

û),ûG,ûN

is positive and significant,

suggesting that firm’s with cumulative performance that is lower than that of its peer
group through the first three quarters of the fiscal year exhibit more upward accruals
management in the fourth quarter of their fiscal year. When the dependent variable is
abnormal total accruals, the coefficient on !"##<=

û),ûG,ûN

is positive (0.0098) and

significant at the 1% level (p<0.0001). Those fourth quarters have abnormal total accruals
that are higher on average by 0.98% of assets compared to the rest of the sample. When
the dependent variable is abnormal current accruals, the coefficient on !"##<=

û),ûG,ûN

positive (0.0111) and significant at the 1% level (p<0.0001). Those fourth quarter have
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is

abnormal current accruals that are higher on average by 1.11% of assets compared to the
rest of the sample.
Table 19 provides the regression results of equation (22). For both measures, the
interaction term of >Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ ú,S4.ù<=

û),ûG,ûN

has positive coefficients. This

indicates that firms just missing (miss by the range of -0.05) the first three quarter’s
cumulative peer performance benchmark and achieving the whole year’s peer
performance benchmark, has additionally more abnormal accruals, which provide
evidence that using quarterly data, firms manage accruals to achieve the peer
performance benchmark.
Real Activities Manipulation Tests
Table 20 provides the regression results of equation (23). For both measures, the
coefficient on the variable of interest !"##<=

û),ûG,ûN

is negative and significant,

suggesting that firm’s with cumulative performance that is lower than that of its peer
group through the first three quarters of the fiscal year will exhibit more upward real
activities manipulation in the fourth quarter of their fiscal year. When the dependent
variable is unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures, the coefficient on
!"##<=

û),ûG,ûN

is negative (-0.0039) and significant at the 1% level (p<0.0001). Those

firm years have unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures that are lower
on average by 0.39% of assets compared to the rest of the sample. When the dependent
variable is abnormal cash flow from operations, the coefficient on !"##<=

û),ûG,ûN

is

negative (-0.0058) and significant at the 1% level (p<0.0001). Those firm years have
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abnormal cash flow from operations that are higher on average by 0.58% of assets
compared to the rest of the sample.
Table 21 provides the regression results of equation (24). When abnormal cash
flow is the dependent variable, the interaction term of >Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ ú,S4.ù<=

û),ûG,ûN

has a positive coefficient. This indicates that firms just missing (miss by the range of 0.05) the first three quarter’s cumulative peer performance benchmark and achieving the
whole year’s peer performance benchmark, has additionally more abnormal cash flow,
which provide evidence that using quarterly data, firms manipulate real activities to
achieve the peer performance benchmark. However, when unexpected abnormal level of
discretionary expenditures is the dependent variable, the coefficient of interaction term of
>Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ ú,S4.ù<=

û),ûG,ûN

does not possess the expected sign.

Logistic Regression Results
Tables 22 and 23 report the results of equation (25). The coefficient on the
interaction term >Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ >?><= (>Üℎ"4ô4<= ∗ >*><= ) captures the additional
probability to restate current year’s earnings if firms just achieve (achieving within the
range of 0.05) current year’s peer performance benchmark with the help of abnormal
accrual. The effect is quite large, the odds of restating current period earnings in the
future increase by 93.93% (136.23%).
Tables 24 through 31 report the results of equation (26). In Tables 24 and 25, the
coefficients on >Üℎ<= _!"#<=R) ∗ >?><= (>Üℎ<= _!"#<=R) ∗ >*><= ) are positive and
significant, suggesting that the level of abnormal accruals will increase the probability of
restatement under the situation that if firm miss the prior year’s peer performance
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benchmark and achieve current year’s peer performance benchmark. In other words, if
firms use abnormal accruals to help them achieve current year’s peer performance
benchmark, they are more likely to restate their current year’s financial statements in the
future.
In Tables 26 and 27, the coefficients on the interaction terms
>Üℎ<= _!"#<å(=R).=RG) ∗ >?><= (>Üℎ<= _!"#<å(=R).=RG) ∗ >*><= ) are positive and significant,
suggesting that the level of abnormal accruals will increase the probability of restatement
under the situation that if firm miss the prior two year’s peer performance benchmark and
achieve current year’s peer performance benchmark.
In Tables 28 and 29, the coefficients on the interaction term >Üℎ<= _$!"#<= ∗
>?><= (>Üℎ<= _$!"#<= ∗ >*><= ) are positive but not significant.
In Tables 30 and 31, the coefficients on the interaction terms >Üℎ¢<£BC

§E,§é,§•

∗

>?><=(ûn) (>Üℎ<= _$!"#<= ∗ >*><= ) are positive and significant, suggesting that the level
of abnormal accruals will increase the probability of restatement if firms miss the first
three quarter’s cumulative peer performance benchmark and achieve the current year’s
peer performance benchmark. In other words, firms under the pressure of achieving the
current year’s peer performance benchmark and use accruals to achieve the current year’s
peer performance benchmark are more likely to restate their current year’s financial
statements in the future.
Tables 32 through 35 report the regression of equation (27). As expected, all
variables of interest (!"##<=R) , !"##<å

=R),=RG
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, $!"##<= , !"##<=

û),ûG,ûN

) exhibit

significant positive effects on the probability of restatement in the future. If firms fail to
reach peer performance in the prior year (i.e., !"##<=R) = 1), the odds of restated current
period earnings in the future increase by 14.14 percent. If firms fail to reach the average
peer performance benchmark over the prior two years (i. e. , !"##<å

=R),=RG

= 1), the

odds of restating current period earnings in the future increase by 16.51%. If firms fail to
reach the expected peer performance benchmark (i. e. , E!"##<= =1), the odds of restating
current year’s earnings in the future increase by 11.42%. For firms fail to reach the
cumulative peer performance benchmark over the first three quarters
(i.e., !"##<=

û),ûG,ûN

= 1), the odds of restating the fourth quarter’s earnings in the

future increase by 18.88%.

VII. CONCLUSION
This dissertation is, to the best of my knowledge, the first study to document the
impact of achieving peer performance on earnings management decisions. The existing
literature has focused on earnings management behavior to achieve three earnings
thresholds: avoid negative earnings, avoid earnings decreases, and avoid negative
surprises. Other than these three benchmarks, peer performance is another important
earnings target, yet is largely ignored in the extant literature.
In my dissertation, I examine whether the peer performance benchmark drives
earnings management. I identify four situations when a firm is likely to manage earnings
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to meet or beat its peer group’s performance, and provide evidence that firms exhibit
more income-increasing accruals management in the current year under those situations:
1) when firms’ prior year performance is below that of their peer group; 2) when firms’
average performance over the prior two years is below that of its peer group; 3) when
firms’ expected performance is below its peer group’s expected performance; and 4)
when firms with cumulative performance that is lower than that of its peer group through
the first three quarters of the fiscal year exhibit more upward accruals management in the
fourth quarter. I also find that that firms exhibit more increase-increasing real activities
manipulation in the current year: 1) when firms’ prior year performance is below that of
their peer group; 2) when firms’ average performance over the prior two years is below
that of its peer group.
I also investigate the likelihood of future restatements of financial statements for
firm-year observations that are subject to earnings management to achieve peer
performance. As the restatement of financial statements is a consequence of prior
earnings management, I show that firms under the following four situations are more
likely to restate current earnings in the future. The influence of peer performance on
earnings management behavior implies that although the RPE can improve compensation
contracts and efficiency in implementing compensation plans, it can have unintended
consequences as it may induce income-increasing earnings management. The presence of
peer performance benchmark also suggests that the decision to manage earnings is not
made in isolation. The historical and current performance information from peer firms is
important factors affecting an individual manager’s proclivity to manage earnings.
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I plan to extend this line of research by investigating the following research
questions in my future studies. First, can compensation committees detect earnings
management and do they revise their compensation contracts subsequently? Second, how
the career concerns of CEOs is associated with the earnings management decision when
firms’ executives are subject to RPE? Third, how do the analysts’ identified peers differ
from the firms’ identified peers for RPE, and how this difference affects financial
reporting behavior and analysts’ forecast errors? Finally, does consistently better
performance compared to peer firms impact firms costs of equity and debt capital?
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Table 1
Sample Derivation
Panel A: Sample Derivation – Abnormal Accrual Measures
Number of firm-year found in Compustat 1988-2012
Number of firm-year that having non-missing values for discretionary accrual measures
Number of firm-year above found in I/B/E/S
Number of firm-year excluding firms in financial and utility industries

116,635
115,595
56,061
47,968

Number of firm-fourth-quarter found in Compustat 1988-2012
Number of firm-fourth-quarter that having non-missing values discretionary accrual measures
Number of firm-fourth-quarter above found in I/B/E/S
Number of firm-fourth-quarter excluding firms in financial and utility industries

167,982
67,864
34,851
29,589

Panel B: Sample Derivation – Real Earnings Management Measures
Number of firm-year found in Compustat 1988-2012
Number of firm-year that having non-missing values for real earnings management measures
Number of firm-year above found in I/B/E/S
Number of firm-year excluding firms in financial and utility industries

116,635
109,682
55,023
46,930

Number of firm-fourth-quarter found in Compustat 1988-2012
Number of firm-fourth-quarter with non-missing values for real earnings management measures
Number of firm-fourth-quarter above found in I/B/E/S
Number of firm-fourth-quarter excluding firms in financial and utility industries

167,982
64,054
31,041
25,779

Panel C: Sample Derivation – Restatement Measures
Number of firm-year found in Compustat 1988-2012
Number of firm-year that having non-missing values
Number of firm-year above found in I/B/E/S
Number of firm-year excluding firms in financial and utility industries
Number of firm-year above merged with Audit Analytics

116,635
115,595
56,061
47,968
29,604

Number of firm-fourth-quarter found in Compustat 1988-2012
Number of firm-fourth-quarter that having non-missing values
Number of firm-fourth-quarter above found in I/B/E/S
Number of firm-fourth quarter excluding firms in financial and utility industries
Number of firm-year above merged with Audit Analytics

167,982
67,864
34,851
29,589
14,682

Table 1 panel A and panel B provide the sample derivation for the tests on earnings management measured
using the 1) discretionary accrual 2) real earnings management measures. Table 1 panel C provides the
sample derivation for the logistic regression on the future restatement.

72

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Variables

N

Mean

SD

25%

Median

75%

>Üℎ"4ô4<=

47968

0.2541

0.4354

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

!"##<=R)

47968

0.5006

0.5000

0.0000

1.0000

1.0000

!"##<å(=R),=RG)

47968

0.4999

0.5000

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

$!"##<=

47968

0.5020

0.5000

0.0000

1.0000

1.0000

ú,S4.ù<=R)

47968

0.2528

0.4346

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

ú,S4.ù<å(=R),=RG)

47968

0.2537

0.4351

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

$ú,S4.ù<=

48643

0.3355

0.4722

0.0000

0.0000

1.0000

>?><=

47968

-0.0176

0.1147

-0.0595

-0.0127

0.0321

>*><=

47968

-0.0132

0.1075

-0.0517

-0.0114

0.0284

PQ>=

47968

0.0071

0.1868

-0.0086

0.0455

0.0900

o!<=

47968

0.5607

0.7947

0.2684

0.4566

0.7329

u+x>?<=

47968

6.1003

1.8415

4.7787

5.9466

7.2948

u$1<=

47968

0.4751

0.2496

0.2918

0.4657

0.6202

rmUDISX <=
rmCASH<=

46930
46930

0.0028
0.0263

0.1005
0.1507

-0.0373
-0.0344

0.0021
0.0310

0.0430
0.0998

>Üℎ"4ô4<= is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s current year’s performance (PQ>= ) is above the
peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words, PQ>= − S44. PQ>= is within the range of (0, 0.05).
!"##<=R) is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s prior year’s performance (PQ>=R) ) is below that
of its peer group.
!"##<å(=R),=RG) is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s average performance (PQ>å =R),=RG ) of
IãA

èIãA

CDé
CDE
the past two years is below that of its peer group. PQ>å =R),=RG is calculated using
.
G
$!"##<= is a dummy variable and it equals one if if firm i’s expected performance ê+.4Ü2#-46_$Se= at
year t is below its peer group’s expected performance for year t. Firm i’s expected performance
ê+.4Ü2#-46_$Se= is calculated using analysts’ consensus forecasted EPS scaled by scaled by assets per
share at the beginning of the fiscal year. Consensus analyst forecasted EPS are the mean analysts’ forecasts
for the next period.
ú,S4.ù<=R) is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s prior year’s performance (PQ>=R) ) is below
that of its peer group by not more than 0.05. To be more specific, PQ>=R) − S44. PQ>=R) is within the
range of (-0.05, 0).
ú,S4.ù<å(=R),=RG) is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s average performance (PQ>å =R),=RG ) of
the past two years is below that of its peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words,PQ>å =R),=RG −

IãA

èIãA

CDé
CDE
S44. PQ>å =R),=RG is within the range of (-0.05, 0). PQ>å =R),=RG is calculated using
.
G
$ú,S4.ù<= is a dummy variable and it equals one if if firm i’s expected performance ê+.4Ü2#-46_$Se= at
year t is below its peer group’s expected performance by no more than 0.05 for year t. In other words,
ê+.4Ü2#-46_$Se= − Peer(ê+.4Ü2#-46JOc = ) is within (-0.05,0). Firm i’s expected performance
ê+.4Ü2#-46_$Se= is calculated using analysts’ consensus forecasted EPS scaled by scaled by assets per
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share at the beginning of the fiscal year. Consensus analyst forecasted EPS are the mean analysts’ forecasts
for the next period.
>?><= is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
@ABC
A@BCDE

= F' + F)

)
A@BCDE

+ FG

∆IJKBC
A@BCDE

−

∆IJMBC
A@BCDE

+ FN

OOJBC
A@BCDE

+ PQ>=R) + ;<=

>*><= is abnormal current accruals, which is defined as the firm specific residuals from the following
equation estimated cross-sectionally for each year-industry combination.
MABC
ABCDE

= F' + F)

)
ABCDE

+ FG

∆IJKBC
ABCDE

−

∆IJMBC
ABCDE

+ PQ>=R) + ;<=

LogAT<= is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM<= is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA<= is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. u$1<= is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
rmUDISX <= is the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures estimated following Zang
(2012). First, estimate the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmDISX <= ) as the residuals from
the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each year and each two-digit SIC
code with at least ten observations.
^_`aBC
)
c
= α' + α)
+ αG BCDE + ε<=
ABCDE

ABCDE

ABCDE

Second, estimate the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmUDISX <= ) as the residuals
from the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year
combination.
rmDISX <= = f' + f) !2.g4-chijk <=R) + fG le*QP$<=R) + fN ?>mIi=k <= + fn o5p8<= + fr sQ><=R) +
ft *:*u$<=R) + fv PQ><= + fw u+x>?<= + fy !-+o<= + f)' $2.,<= + ;<=
To be consistent with Zang (2012), the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures are
multiplied by (-1) such that higher values indicate greater amounts of unexpected abnormal level of
discretionary expenditures reduced by firms to increase reported earnings.
rmCASH<= is the abnormal cash flow from operations estimated following Roychowdhury (2006),which is
defined as the firm specific residuals from the following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each yearindustry combination.
*êQ=
1
e=
∆e=
= &' + &)
+ f=
+ fG
+ ;=
>=R)
>=R)
>=R)
>=R)
where >= is the total assetss at the end of period t, e= the sales during period t and ∆e= = e= − e=R)
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix
!"!#$%&
0.0910***

!'!#$
0.9353***

!'!#$%&
0.0286***

()!$
0.3239***

*+#$
0.0274***

,-.!"#$
-0.0186***

,/0#$
-0.0337***

rmUDISX #$
-0.5758***

rmCASH#$
-0.2986***

1.000

0.0475***

0.9359***

0.0940***

0.0430***

-0.0156***

-0.0261***

-0.1043***

-0.0539***

0.8938***

0.0792***

1.0000

0.0546***

0.3035***

0.0167***

-0.0593***

-0.0666***

-0.5629***

-0.2989***

!'!#$%& 0.0690***

0.8951***

0.0908***

1.0000

0.0539***

0.0337***

-0.0558***

-0.0451***

-0.0675***

-0.0446***

!"!#$

!"!#$
1.0000

!"!#$%& 0.1636***
!'!#$
()!$

0.1400***

0.0002

0.1299***

-0.0168***

1.0000

-0.0098**

0.2877***

-0.1680***

-0.0282***

0.5491***

*+#$

0.0499***

0.0906***

0.0206***

0.0647***

-0.3024***

1.0000

-0.0377***

-0.1986***

-0.0003

-0.0468***

,-.!"#$ -0.0367***

-0.0374***

-0.0924***

-0.0897***

0.1796***

-0.0360***

1.0000

0.2891***

-0.0128***

0.2019***

0.0002

-0.0328***

-0.0362***

-0.1969***

-0.0907***

0.3812***

1.0000

0.0340***

-0.1953***

-0.5778***
rmUDISX
#$

-0.1174***

-0.5520***

-0.0759***

0.0203***

-0.0325***

-0.0504***

0.0107**

1.0000

0.4516***

rmCASH#$ -0.3830***

-0.1162***

-0.3746***

-0.0926***

0.4764***

-0.2081***

0.1627***

-0.2165***

0.3690***

1.0000

,/0#$

0.0151***

*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Upper diagonal cells are Pearson correlations and lower diagonal cells are Spearman correlations.
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year
combination:
;<=>
<;=>?@

= BC + B&

&
<;=>?@

+ BE

∆GHI=>
<;=>?@

−

∆GHK=>
<;=>?@

+ BL

MMH=>
<;=>?@

+ ()!$%& + N#$

!'!#$ is abnormal current accruals, which is defined as the firm specific residuals from the following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each yearindustry combination.
K<=>
<=>?@

= BC + B&

&
<=>?@

+ BE

∆GHI=>
<=>?@

−

∆GHK=>
<=>?@

+ ()!$%& + N#$

LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided by market value of equity in year t for firm i.
ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. ,/0#$ is total liability divided by
total assets in year t.
rmUDISX #$ is the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures estimated following Zang (2012). First, estimate the abnormal level of
discretionary expenditures (rmDISX #$ ) as the residuals from the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each year and each
two-digit SIC code with at least ten observations.
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WXYZ=>
<=>?@

= αC + α&

&
<=>?@

+ αE

\=>?@
<=>?@

+ ε#$

Second, estimate the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmUDISX #$ ) as the residuals from the regression below. The regression is
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination.
rmDISX #$ = ^C + ^& +_`abc\defg #$%& + ^E hi')(/#$%& + ^L "!jGe$g #$ + ^k *lm8#$ + ^o p)!#$%& + ^q 'r',/#$%& + ^s ()!#$ + ^t ,-.!"#$ +
^u +c-*#$ + ^&C /_`v#$ + N#$
To be consistent with Zang (2012), the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures are multiplied by (-1) such that higher values indicate
greater amounts of unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures reduced by firms to increase reported earnings.
rmCASH#$ is the abnormal cash flow from operations estimated following Roychowdhury (2006),which is defined as the firm specific residuals from the
following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each year-industry combination.
'w)$
1
i$
∆i$
= xC + x&
+ ^$
+ ^E
+ N$
!$%&
!$%&
!$%&
!$%&
where !$ is the total assetss at the end of period t, i$ the sales during period t and ∆i$ = i$ − i$%&
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Table 4
Accruals Management of Firms Achieving Current Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
Model 1: !"!#$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ 012!"#$ + &3 45#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 :;!#$ + &< !"!#$=) +
&> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Model 2: !S!#$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ 012!#$ + &3 45#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 :;!#$ + &< !S!#$=) +
&> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
!"!#$
!S!#$
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
0.0575***
<.0001
0.0661***
<.0001
Intercept
0.0055***
<.0001
0.0032***
0.0032
!*ℎ,-.-$
-0.0104***
<.0001
-0.0103***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0047***
<.0001
0.0033***
<.0001
45#$
0.0324***
<.0001
0.0192***
<.0001
078#$
0.2335***
<.0001
0.2086***
<.0001
:;!#$
0.0382***
<.0001
0.0163***
<.0001
!"!#$=) or !S!#$=)
-0.0002
0.9036
0.0006
0.7267
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.0019
0.2076
-0.0031**
0.0325
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.0113***
<.0001
-0.00998**
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed
Yes
Yes
Effects
N
47968
47968
Adjusted R2
0.1381
0.1282
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
TUVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ Z3

aa]VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

!S!#$ is abnormal current accruals, which is defined as the firm specific residuals from the following
equation estimated cross-sectionally for each year-industry combination.
`UVW
UVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

!*ℎ,-.-#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s current year’s performance (:;!$ ) is above the
peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words, :;!$ − b--? :;!$ is within the range of (0, 0.05).
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
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Table 5
Accruals Management of Firms Missing Prior Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
Model 1: !"!#$ = &' + &) 5,@@#$=) + &/ 012!"#$ + &3 45#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 :;!#$ + &< !"!#$=) +
&> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Model 2: !S!#$ = &' + &) 5,@@#$=) + &/ 012!#$ + &3 45#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 :;!#$ + &< !S!#$=) +
&> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
!"!#$
!S!#$
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
0.0581***
<.0001
0.0659***
<.0001
Intercept
0.0442***
<.0001
0.0386***
<.0001
5,@@#$=)
-0.0124***
<.0001
-0.0120***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0033***
<.0001
0.0021***
0.0006
45#$
0.0214***
<.0001
0.0098***
<.0001
078#$
0.2741***
<.0001
0.2441***
<.0001
:;!#$
0.0624***
<.0001
0.0391***
<.0001
!"!#$=) or !S!#$=)
-0.0034*
0.0561
-0.0021
0.2254
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
0.0030**
0.0434
0.0012
0.4132
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.0085***
<.0001
-0.0075***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed
Yes
Yes
Effects
N
47968
47968
Adjusted R2
0.1685
0.1551
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
TUVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ Z3

aa]VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

!S!#$ is abnormal current accruals, which is defined as the firm specific residuals from the following
equation estimated cross-sectionally for each year-industry combination.
`UVW
UVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

5,@@#$=) is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s prior year’s performance (:;!$=) ) is below that
of its peer group.
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
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Table 6
Accruals Management of Firms Missing Prior Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark and Achieving
Current Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
Model 1: !"!#$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ lKb-?m#$=) + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#$=) + &6 012!"#$ +
&9 45#$ + &< 078#$ + &> :;!#$ + &D !"!#$=) + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ +
&)) "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Model 2: !S!#$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ lKb-?m#$=) + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#$=) + &6 012!"#$ +
&9 45#$ + &< 078#$ + &> :;!#$ + &D !S!#$=) + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ +
&)) "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
!"!#$
!S!#$
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
0.0583***
<.0001
0.0663***
<.0001
Intercept
0.0039***
0.0035
0.0014
0.2605
!*ℎ,-.-#$
0.0014
0.3007
-0.0008
0.5221
lKb-?m
0.0068***
0.0090
0.0072***
0.0034
!*ℎ,-.-#$
∗ lKb-?m#$=)
-0.0105***
<.0001
-0.0103***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0047***
<.0001
0.0033***
<.0001
45#$
0.0320***
<.0001
0.0192***
<.0001
078#$
0.2337***
<.0001
0.2087***
<.0001
:;!#$
0.0380***
<.0001
0.0164***
<.0001
!"!#$=) or !S!#$=)
-0.0002
0.9012
0.0007
0.6717
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.0017
0.2702
-0.0029**
0.0460
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.0113***
<.0001
-0.0100***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
N
47968
47968
Adjusted R2
0.1383
0.1284
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
TUVW
)
∆\]^VW
∆\]`VW
aa]VW
= Z' + Z)
+ Z/
−
+ Z3
+ :;!$=) + R#$
UTVWXY

UTVWXY

UTVWXY

UTVWXY

UTVWXY

!S!#$ is abnormal current accruals, which is defined as the firm specific residuals from the following
equation estimated cross-sectionally for each year-industry combination.
`UVW
UVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

lKb-?m#$=) is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s prior year’s performance (:;!$=) ) is below
that of its peer group by not more than 0.05. To be more specific, :;!$=) − b--? :;!$=) is within the
range of (-0.05, 0).
!*ℎ,-.-#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s current year’s performance (:;!$ ) is above the
peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words, :;!$ − b--? :;!$ is within the range of (0, 0.05).
!*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#$=) is the interaction term of !*ℎ,-.-#$ and lKb-?m#$=) .
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of

79

[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
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Table 7
Real Earnings Management of Firms Achieving Current Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
Model 1: rmUDISX #$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ 012!"#$ + &3 45#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 :;!#$ +
&< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + &F !"!#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Model 2: rmCASH#$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ 012!"#$ + &3 45#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 :;!#$ +
&< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + &F !"!#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
rmUDISX #$
rmCASH#$
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
0.0373***
<.0001
0.0580***
<.0001
Intercept
-0.0002
0.7884
-0.0035***
0.0002
!*ℎ,-.-#$
-0.0073***
<.0001
0.0023***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0047***
<.0001
-0.0041***
<.0001
45#$
0.0437***
<.0001
-0.0361***
<.0001
078#$
0.1796***
<.0001
0.5960***
<.0001
:;!#$
-0.0079***
<.0001
0.0025*
0.0854
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.0039***
0.0001
0.0015
0.2263
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.0001
0.8582
0.0046***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
-0.5679***
<.0001
-0.6883***
<.0001
!"!#$
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed
Yes
Yes
Effects
N
46930
46930
Adjusted R2
0.4160
0.6455
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
rmUDISX #$ is the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures estimated following Zang
(2012). First, estimate the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmDISX #$ ) as the residuals from
the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each year and each two-digit SIC
code with at least ten observations.
xyz{VW
UVWXY

= α' + α)

)
UVWXY

+ α/

}VWXY
UVWXY

+ ε#$

Second, estimate the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmUDISX #$ ) as the residuals
from the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year
combination.
rmDISX #$ = ' + ) 5Q?Ä-Å}ÇÉÑÖ #$=) + / ÜáS;:7#$=) + 3 "!à\É$Ö #$ + 6 4Jâ8#$ + 9 ã;!#$=)
+ < SPS07#$=)
+> :;!#$ + D 012!"#$ + F 5Å14#$ + )' 7Q?K#$ + R#$
To be consistent with Zang (2012), the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures are
multiplied by (-1) such that higher values indicate greater amounts of unexpected abnormal level of
discretionary expenditures reduced by firms to increase reported earnings.
rmCASH#$ is the abnormal cash flow from operations estimated following Roychowdhury (2006),which is
defined as the firm specific residuals from the following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each yearindustry combination.
Så;$
1
á$
∆á$
= &' + &)
+ $
+ /
+ R$
!$=)
!$=)
!$=)
!$=)
where !$ is the total assetss at the end of period t, á$ the sales during period t and ∆á$ = á$ − á$=) .
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!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
TUVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ Z3

aa]VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

!*ℎ,-.-#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s current year’s performance (:;!$ ) is above the
peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words, :;!$ − b--? :;!$ is within the range of (0, 0.05).
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
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Table 8
Real Earnings Management of Firms Missing Prior Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
Model 1: rmUDISX #$ = &' + &) 5,@@#$=) + &/ 012!"#$ + &3 45#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 :;!#$ +
&< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + &F !"!#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Model 2: rmCASH#$ = &' + &) 5,@@#$=) + &/ 012!"#$ + &3 45#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 :;!#$ +
&< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + &F !"!#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
rmUDISX #$
rmCASH#$
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
0.0360***
<.0001
0.0684***
<.0001
Intercept
0.0062***
<.0001
0.0136***
<.0001
5,@@#$=)
-0.0071***
<.0001
0.0017***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0043***
<.0001
-0.0064***
<.0001
45#$
0.0401***
<.0001
-0.0531***
<.0001
078#$
0.1555***
<.0001
0.6055***
<.0001
:;!#$
-0.0092***
<.0001
0.0031*
0.0545
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.0048***
<.0001
0.0004
0.7487
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.0005
0.5416
0.0052***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
-0.5954***
<.0001
-0.7010***
<.0001
!"!#$
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed
Yes
Yes
Effects
N
46930
46930
Adjusted R2
0.3867
0.6015
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
rmUDISX #$ is the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures estimated following Zang
(2012). First, estimate the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmDISX #$ ) as the residuals from
the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each year and each two-digit SIC
code with at least ten observations.
xyz{VW
UVWXY

= α' + α)

)
UVWXY

+ α/

}VWXY
UVWXY

+ ε#$

Second, estimate the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmUDISX #$ ) as the residuals
from the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year
combination.
rmDISX #$ = ' + ) 5Q?Ä-Å}ÇÉÑÖ #$=) + / ÜáS;:7#$=) + 3 "!à\É$Ö #$ + 6 4Jâ8#$ + 9 ã;!#$=)
+ < SPS07#$=)
+> :;!#$ + D 012!"#$ + F 5Å14#$ + )' 7Q?K#$ + R#$
To be consistent with Zang (2012), the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures are
multiplied by (-1) such that higher values indicate greater amounts of unexpected abnormal level of
discretionary expenditures reduced by firms to increase reported earnings.
rmCASH#$ is the abnormal cash flow from operations estimated following Roychowdhury (2006),which is
defined as the firm specific residuals from the following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each yearindustry combination.
Så;$
1
á$
∆á$
= &' + &)
+ $
+ /
+ R$
!$=)
!$=)
!$=)
!$=)
where !$ is the total assetss at the end of period t, á$ the sales during period t and ∆á$ = á$ − á$=) .
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!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
TUVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ Z3

aa]VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

5,@@#$=) is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s prior year’s performance (:;!$=) ) is below that
of its peer group.
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].

Table 9
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Real Earnings Management of Firms Missing Prior Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark and
Achieving Current year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
Model 1: rmUDISX #$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ lKb-?m#$=) + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#$=) + &6 012!"#$ +
&9 45#$ + &< 078#$ + &> :;!#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + &)) !"!#$ +
I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Model 2: rmCASH#$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ lKb-?m#$=) + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#$=) + &6 012!"#$ +
&9 45#$ + &< 078#$ + &> :;!#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + &)) !"!#$ +
I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
rmUDISX #$
rmCASH#$
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Intercept
!*ℎ,-.-#$
lKb-?m#$=)
!*ℎ,-.-#$
∗ lKb-?m#$=)
012!"#$
45#$
078#$
:;!#$
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
!"!#$
Year Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
N
Adjusted R2

Coefficients
0.0374***
0.0002
-0.0004
0.0009
-0.0073***
0.0047***
0.0437***
0.1796***
-0.0079***
-0.0039***
-0.0001
-0.5679
Yes
Yes
46930
0.4159

p-value
<.0001
0.8181
0.6412
0.6148
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0002
0.8481
<.0001

Coefficients
0.0565***
-0.0078***
-0.0061***
0.0094***
0.0027***
-0.0037***
-0.0352***
0.5957***
0.0031**
0.0016
0.0045***
0.0565***
Yes
Yes
46930
0.6459

p-value
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0355
0.1925
<.0001
<.0001

*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
rmUDISX #$ is the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures estimated following Zang
(2012). First, estimate the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmDISX #$ ) as the residuals from
the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each year and each two-digit SIC
code with at least ten observations.
xyz{VW
UVWXY

= α' + α)

)
UVWXY

+ α/

}VWXY
UVWXY

+ ε#$

Second, estimate the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmUDISX #$ ) as the residuals
from the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year
combination.
rmDISX #$ = ' + ) 5Q?Ä-Å}ÇÉÑÖ #$=) + / ÜáS;:7#$=) + 3 "!à\É$Ö #$ + 6 4Jâ8#$ + 9 ã;!#$=)
+ < SPS07#$=)
+> :;!#$ + D 012!"#$ + F 5Å14#$ + )' 7Q?K#$ + R#$
To be consistent with Zang (2012), the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures are
multiplied by (-1) such that higher values indicate greater amounts of unexpected abnormal level of
discretionary expenditures reduced by firms to increase reported earnings.
rmCASH#$ is the abnormal cash flow from operations estimated following Roychowdhury (2006),which is
defined as the firm specific residuals from the following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each yearindustry combination.
Så;$
1
á$
∆á$
= &' + &)
+ $
+ /
+ R$
!$=)
!$=)
!$=)
!$=)
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where !$ is the total assetss at the end of period t, á$ the sales during period t and ∆á$ = á$ − á$=) .
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
TUVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ Z3

aa]VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

lKb-?m#$=) is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s prior year’s performance (:;!$=) ) is below
that of its peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words, :;!$=) − b--? :;!$=) is within the range
of (-0.05, 0).
!*ℎ,-.-#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s current year’s performance (:;!$ ) is above the
peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words, :;!$ − b--? :;!$ is within the range of (0, 0.05).
!*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#$=) is the interaction term of !*ℎ,-.-#$ and lKb-?m#$=) .
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].

Table 10
Accruals Management of Firms Missing Prior Two Year’s Mean Peer Performance Benchmark

86

Model 1: !"!#$ = &' + &) 5,@@#ç($=),$=/) + &/ LogAT#$ + &3 BM#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 ROA#$ + &< !"!#$=) +
&> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Model 2: !S!#$ = &' + &) 5,@@#ç($=),$=/) + &/ LogAT#$ + &3 BM#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 ROA#$ + &< !S!#$=) +
&> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
!"!#$
!S!#$
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
<.0001
<.0001
0.0555***
0.0636***
Intercept
<.0001
<.0001
5,@@#ç($=),$=/)
0.0415***
0.0373***
<.0001
<.0001
LogAT#$
-0.0120***
-0.0117***
0.0038***
<.0001
0.0024***
<.0001
BM#$
0.0215***
<.0001
0.0095***
<.0001
078#$
0.2687***
<.0001
0.2399***
<.0001
ROA#$
<.0001
<.0001
!"!#$=) or !S!#$=)
0.0510***
0.0292***
0.1511
0.4219
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.0026
-0.0014
0.0283
0.2839
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
0.0033**
0.0015
-0.0088***
<.0001
-0.0077***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed
Yes
Yes
Effects
47968
47968
N
0.1660
0.1542
Adjusted R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
TUVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ Z3

aa]VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

!S!#$ is abnormal current accruals, which is defined as the firm specific residuals from the following
equation estimated cross-sectionally for each year-industry combination.
`UVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

5,@@#ç($=),$=/) is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s average performance (:;!ç

$=),$=/
\êUWXë í\êUWXY

) of

the past two years is below that of its peer group. :;!ç $=),$=/ is calculated using
.
/
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
Table 11
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Accruals Management of Firms Missing Prior Two Year’s Mean Peer Performance Benchmark and
Achieving Current Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
Model 1: !"!#$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/) + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/) +
&6 LogAT#$ + &9 BM#$ + &< 078#$ + &> ROA#$ + &D !"!#$=) + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ +
&)) "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Model 2: !S!#$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/) + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/) +
&6 LogAT#$ + &9 BM#$ + &< 078#$ + &> ROA#$ + &D !S!#$=) + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ +
&)) "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
!"!#$
!S!#$
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
0.0586***
<.0001
0.0665***
<.0001
Intercept
0.0031**
0.0196
0.0007
0.5606
!*ℎ,-.-#$
0.0011
0.4017
-0.0014
0.2588
lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/)
0.0097***
0.0002
0.0097***
<.0001
!*ℎ,-.-#$
∗ lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/)
-0.0105***
<.0001
-0.0103***
<.0001
LogAT#$
0.0047***
<.0001
0.0033***
<.0001
BM#$
0.0319***
<.0001
0.0191***
<.0001
078#$
0.2337***
<.0001
0.2087***
<.0001
ROA#$
0.0381***
<.0001
0.0165***
<.0001
!"!#$=) or !S!#$=)
-0.0001
0.9686
0.0009
0.6217
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.0017
0.2797
-0.0029**
0.0458
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.0114***
<.0001
-0.0100***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
47968
47968
N
0.1385
0.1285
Adjusted R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
TUVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ Z3

aa]VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

!S!#$ is abnormal current accruals, which is defined as the firm specific residuals from the following
equation estimated cross-sectionally for each year-industry combination.
`UVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/) is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s average performance (:;!ç $=),$=/ ) of
the past two years is below that of its peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words,:;!ç $=),$=/ −
\êU

í\êU

WXë
WXY
b--? :;!ç $=),$=/ is within the range of (-0.05, 0). :;!ç $=),$=/ is calculated using
.
/
!*ℎ,-.-#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s current year’s performance (:;!$ ) is above the
peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words, :;!$ − b--? :;!$ is within the range of (0, 0.05).
!*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/) is the interaction term of !*ℎ,-.-#$ and lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/) .
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
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margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].

Table 12
Real Earnings Management of Firms Missing Prior Two Year’s Mean Peer Performance Benchmark
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Model 1: rmUDISX #$ = &' + &) 5,@@#ç($=),$=/) + &/ LogAT#$ + &3 BM#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 ROA#$ +
&< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + &F !"!#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Model 2: rmCASH#$ = &' + &) 5,@@#ç($=),$=/) + &/ LogAT#$ + &3 BM#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 ROA#$ +
&< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + &F !"!#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
rmUDISX #$
rmCASH#$
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
0.0357***
<.0001
0.0676***
<.0001
Intercept
0.0042*** <.0001
0.0123*** <.0001
5,@@#ç($=),$=/)
-0.0069*** <.0001
0.0019*** <.0001
LogAT#$
0.0044*** <.0001
-0.0063*** <.0001
BM#$
0.0405*** <.0001
-0.0530*** <.0001
078#$
0.1527*** <.0001
0.6029*** <.0001
ROA#$
-0.0090*** <.0001
0.0034**
0.0366
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.0049*** <.0001
0.0005
0.7349
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.0006
0.4721
0.0052*** <.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
-0.5938*** <.0001
-0.7000*** <.0001
!"!#$
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed
Yes
Yes
Effects
46930
46930
N
0.3863
0.6012
Adjusted R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
rmUDISX #$ is the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures estimated following Zang
(2012). First, estimate the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmDISX #$ ) as the residuals from
the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each year and each two-digit SIC
code with at least ten observations.
xyz{VW
UVWXY

= α' + α)

)
UVWXY

+ α/

}VWXY
UVWXY

+ ε#$

Second, estimate the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmUDISX #$ ) as the residuals
from the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year
combination.
rmDISX #$ = ' + ) 5Q?Ä-Å}ÇÉÑÖ #$=) + / ÜáS;:7#$=) + 3 "!à\É$Ö #$ + 6 4Jâ8#$ + 9 ã;!#$=)
+ < SPS07#$=)
+> :;!#$ + D 012!"#$ + F 5Å14#$ + )' 7Q?K#$ + R#$
To be consistent with Zang (2012), the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures are
multiplied by (-1) such that higher values indicate greater amounts of unexpected abnormal level of
discretionary expenditures reduced by firms to increase reported earnings.
rmCASH#$ is the abnormal cash flow from operations estimated following Roychowdhury (2006),which is
defined as the firm specific residuals from the following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each yearindustry combination.
Så;$
1
á$
∆á$
= &' + &)
+ $
+ /
+ R$
!$=)
!$=)
!$=)
!$=)
where !$ is the total assetss at the end of period t, á$ the sales during period t and ∆á$ = á$ − á$=) .
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
TUVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ Z3
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aa]VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

5,@@#ç($=),$=/) is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s average performance (:;!ç

$=),$=/
\êUWXë í\êUWXY

) of

the past two years is below that of its peer group. :;!ç $=),$=/ is calculated using
.
/
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].

Table 13
Real Earnings Management of Firms Missing Prior Two Year’s Mean Peer Performance Benchmark
and Achieving Current Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
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Model 1: rmUDISX #$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/) + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/) +
&6 LogAT#$ + &9 BM#$ + &< 078#$ + &> ROA#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ +
&)) !"!#$ + I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Model 2: rmCASH#$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/) + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/) +
&6 LogAT#$ + &9 BM#$ + &< 078#$ + &> ROA#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ +
&)) !"!#$ + I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
rmUDISX #$
rmCASH#$
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
0.0380***
<.0001
0.0575***
<.0001
Intercept
-0.0002
0.8110
-0.0048***
<.0001
!*ℎ,-.-#$
0.0029***
0.0012
-0.0037***
0.0007
lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/)
0.0003
0.8574
0.0048**
0.0207
!*ℎ,-.-#$
∗ lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/)
-0.0075***
<.0001
0.0025***
<.0001
LogAT#$
0.0046***
<.0001
-0.0039***
<.0001
BM#$
0.0433***
<.0001
-0.0357***
<.0001
078#$
0.1798***
<.0001
0.5959***
<.0001
ROA#$
-0.0080***
<.0001
0.0028**
0.0607
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.0038***
0.0002
0.0015
0.2228
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.0001
0.8477
0.0046***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
-0.5681***
<.0001
-0.6883***
<.0001
!"!#$
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
46930
46930
N
0.4161
0.6456
Adjusted R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
rmUDISX #$ is the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures estimated following Zang
(2012). First, estimate the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmDISX #$ ) as the residuals from
the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each year and each two-digit SIC
code with at least ten observations.
xyz{VW
UVWXY

= α' + α)

)
UVWXY

+ α/

}VWXY
UVWXY

+ ε#$

Second, estimate the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmUDISX #$ ) as the residuals
from the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year
combination.
rmDISX #$ = ' + ) 5Q?Ä-Å}ÇÉÑÖ #$=) + / ÜáS;:7#$=) + 3 "!à\É$Ö #$ + 6 4Jâ8#$ + 9 ã;!#$=)
+ < SPS07#$=)
+> :;!#$ + D 012!"#$ + F 5Å14#$ + )' 7Q?K#$ + R#$
To be consistent with Zang (2012), the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures are
multiplied by (-1) such that higher values indicate greater amounts of unexpected abnormal level of
discretionary expenditures reduced by firms to increase reported earnings.
rmCASH#$ is the abnormal cash flow from operations estimated following Roychowdhury (2006),which is
defined as the firm specific residuals from the following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each yearindustry combination.
Så;$
1
á$
∆á$
= &' + &)
+ $
+ /
+ R$
!$=)
!$=)
!$=)
!$=)
where !$ is the total assetss at the end of period t, á$ the sales during period t and ∆á$ = á$ − á$=) .
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!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
TUVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ Z3

aa]VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/) is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s average performance (:;!ç $=),$=/ ) of
the past two years is below that of its peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words,:;!ç $=),$=/ −
\êU

í\êU

WXë
WXY
b--? :;!ç $=),$=/ is within the range of (-0.05, 0). :;!ç $=),$=/ is calculated using
.
/
!*ℎ,-.-#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s current year’s performance (:;!$ ) is above the
peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words, :;!$ − b--? :;!$ is within the range of (0, 0.05).
!*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/) is the interaction term of !*ℎ,-.-#$ and lKb-?m#ç($=),$=/)

LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].

Table 14
Accruals Management of Firms Missing Current Year’s Expected Peer Performance Benchmark
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Model 1: !"!#$ = &' + &) 75,@@#$ + &/ LogAT#$ + &3 BM#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 ROA#$ + &< !"!#$=) +
&> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Model 2: !S!#$ = &' + &) 75,@@#$ + &/ LogAT#$ + &3 BM#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 ROA#$ + &< !S!#$=) +
&> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
!"!#$
!S!#$
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
0.0596***
<.0001
0.0675***
<.0001
Intercept
0.0230***
<.0001
0.0199***
<.0001
75,@@#$
-0.0115***
<.0001
-0.0113***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0033***
<.0001
0.0020***
0.0009
45#$
0.0282***
<.0001
0.0157***
<.0001
078#$
0.2614***
<.0001
0.2322***
<.0001
:;!#$
0.0388***
<.0001
0.0172***
<.0001
!"!#$=) or !S!#$=)
-0.0028
0.1279
-0.0015
0.3819
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1
0.0001
0.9503
-0.0014
0.3129
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2
-0.0112***
<.0001
-0.0099***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed
Yes
Yes
Effects
47968
47968
N
2
0.1458
0.1349
Adjusted R
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
TUVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)
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∆\]`VW
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UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

!S!#$ is abnormal current accruals, which is defined as the firm specific residuals from the following
equation estimated cross-sectionally for each year-industry combination.
`UVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

75,@@#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if if firm i’s expected performance å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ at
year t is below its peer group’s expected performance for year t. Firm i’s expected performance
å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ is calculated using analysts’ consensus forecasted EPS scaled by scaled by assets per
share at the beginning of the fiscal year. Consensus analyst forecasted EPS are the mean analysts’ forecasts
for the next period.
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
Table 15
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Accruals Management of Firms Missing Current Year’s Expected Peer Performance Benchmark
and Achieving Current Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
Model 1: !"!#$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ 7lKb-?m#$ + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ 7lKb-?m#$ + &6 LogAT#$ +
&9 BM#$ + &< 078#$ + &> ROA#$ + &D !"!#$=) + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ +
&)) "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Model 2: !S!#$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ 7lKb-?m#$ + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ 7lKb-?m#$ + &6 LogAT#$ +
&9 BM#$ + &< 078#$ + &> ROA#$ + &D !S!#$=) + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ +
&)) "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Dependent Variable
Model 1: !"!#$
Model 1: !S!#$
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
0.0576***
<.0001
0.0656***
<.0001
Intercept
0.0027*
0.0535
0.0006
0.6234
!*ℎ,-.-#$
-0.0014
0.2568
-0.0029**
0.0139
7lKb-?m#$
0.0094***
0.0001
0.0080***
0.0006
!*ℎ,-.-#$
∗ 7lKb-?m#$
-0.0103***
<.0001
-0.0101***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0048***
<.0001
0.0034***
<.0001
45#$
0.0324***
<.0001
0.0195***
<.0001
078#$
0.2336***
<.0001
0.2086***
<.0001
:;!#$
0.0382***
<.0001
0.0164***
<.0001
!"!#$=) or !S!#$=)
0.0000
0.9980
0.0011
0.5354
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1
-0.0019
0.2112
-0.0031**
0.0292
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2
-0.0115***
<.0001
-0.0100***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed
Yes
Yes
Effects
47968
47968
N
2
0.1384
0.1284
Adjusted R
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
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!S!#$ is abnormal current accruals, which is defined as the firm specific residuals from the following
equation estimated cross-sectionally for each year-industry combination.
`UVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

7lKb-?m#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if if firm i’s expected performance å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ at
year t is below its peer group’s expected performance by no more than 0.05 for year t. In other words,
å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ − Peer(å1?-*Q@Å-B]a} $ ) is within (-0.05,0). Firm i’s expected performance
å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ is calculated using analysts’ consensus forecasted EPS scaled by scaled by assets per
share at the beginning of the fiscal year. Consensus analyst forecasted EPS are the mean analysts’ forecasts
for the next period.
!*ℎ,-.-#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s current year’s performance (:;!$ ) is above the
peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words, :;!$ − b--? :;!$ is within the range of (0, 0.05).
!*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ 7lKb-?m#$ is the interaction term of !*ℎ,-.-#$ and 7lKb-?m#$ .
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
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"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].

Table 16
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Real Earnings Management of Firms Missing Current Year’s Expected Peer Performance
Benchmark
Model 1: rmUDISX #$ = &' + &) 75,@@#$ + &/ LogAT#$ + &3 BM#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 ROA#$ +
&< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + &F !"!#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Model 2: rmCASH#$ = &' + &) 75,@@#$ + &/ LogAT#$ + &3 BM#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 ROA#$ +
&< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + &F !"!#$ + I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
rmUDISX #$
rmCASH#$
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
0.0358***
<.0001
0.0676***
<.0001
Intercept
0.0010
0.221
-0.0015
0.1282
75,@@#$
-0.0068***
<.0001
0.0025***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0044***
<.0001
-0.0060***
<.0001
45#$
0.0414***
<.0001
-0.0498***
<.0001
078#$
0.1496***
<.0001
0.58888**
<.0001
:;!#$
-0.0089***
<.0001
0.0041**
0.0125
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.0054***
<.0001
-0.0011
0.4169
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.0008
0.3374
0.0046***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
-0.5909***
<.0001
-0.6898***
<.0001
!"!#$
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Industry Fixed
Yes
Yes
Effects
46930
46930
N
2
0.3859
0.5998
Adjusted R
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
rmUDISX #$ is the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures estimated following Zang
(2012). First, estimate the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmDISX #$ ) as the residuals from
the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each year and each two-digit SIC
code with at least ten observations.
xyz{VW
UVWXY

= α' + α)

)
UVWXY

+ α/

}VWXY
UVWXY

+ ε#$

Second, estimate the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmUDISX #$ ) as the residuals
from the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year
combination.
rmDISX #$ = ' + ) 5Q?Ä-Å}ÇÉÑÖ #$=) + / ÜáS;:7#$=) + 3 "!à\É$Ö #$ + 6 4Jâ8#$ + 9 ã;!#$=)
+ < SPS07#$=)
+> :;!#$ + D 012!"#$ + F 5Å14#$ + )' 7Q?K#$ + R#$
To be consistent with Zang (2012), the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures are
multiplied by (-1) such that higher values indicate greater amounts of unexpected abnormal level of
discretionary expenditures reduced by firms to increase reported earnings.
rmCASH#$ is the abnormal cash flow from operations estimated following Roychowdhury (2006),which is
defined as the firm specific residuals from the following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each yearindustry combination.
Så;$
1
á$
∆á$
= &' + &)
+ $
+ /
+ R$
!$=)
!$=)
!$=)
!$=)
where !$ is the total assetss at the end of period t, á$ the sales during period t and ∆á$ = á$ − á$=) .
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
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TUVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ Z3

aa]VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

75,@@#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if if firm i’s expected performance å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ at
year t is below its peer group’s expected performance for year t. Firm i’s expected performance
å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ is calculated using analysts’ consensus forecasted EPS scaled by scaled by assets per
share at the beginning of the fiscal year. Consensus analyst forecasted EPS are the mean analysts’ forecasts
for the next period.
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
The sample period spans the years 1990 to 2012.

Table 17
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Real Earnings Management of Firms Missing Current Year’s Expected Peer Performance
Benchmark and Achieving Current Year’ Peer Performance Benchmark
Model 1: rmUDISX #$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ 7lKb-?m#$ + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ 7lKb-?m#$ + &6 LogAT#$ +
&9 BM#$ + &< 078#$ + &> ROA#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + &)) !"!#$ +
I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
Model 2: rmCASH#$ = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ 7lKb-?m#$ + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ 7lKb-?m#$ + &6 LogAT#$ +
&9 BM#$ + &< 078#$ + &> ROA#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + &)) !"!#$ +
I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$
rmUDISX #$
rmCASH#$
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
0.0381***
<.0001
0.0570***
<.0001
Intercept
-0.0007
0.4395
-0.0050***
<.0001
!*ℎ,-.-#$
0.0019**
0.0230
-0.0037***
0.0003
7lKb-?m#$
0.0024
0.1544
0.0042**
0.0372
!*ℎ,-.-#$
∗ 7lKb-?m#$
-0.0074***
<.0001
0.0026***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0046***
<.0001
-0.0039***
<.0001
45#$
0.0434***
<.0001
-0.0356***
<.0001
078#$
0.1798***
<.0001
0.5959***
<.0001
:;!#$
-0.0082***
<.0001
0.0031**
0.0345
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.0038***
0.0002
0.0014
0.2698
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.0003
0.7176
0.0047***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
-0.5680***
<.0001
-0.6884***
<.0001
!"!#$
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Industry Fixed
Yes
Yes
Effects
46930
46930
N
2
0.4161
0.6456
Adjusted R
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
rmUDISX #$ is the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures estimated following Zang
(2012). First, estimate the abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmDISX #$ ) as the residuals from
the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each year and each two-digit SIC
code with at least ten observations.
xyz{VW
UVWXY

= α' + α)

)
UVWXY

+ α/

}VWXY
UVWXY

+ ε#$

Second, estimate the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures (rmUDISX #$ ) as the residuals
from the regression below. The regression is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year
combination.
rmDISX #$ = ' + ) 5Q?Ä-Å}ÇÉÑÖ #$=) + / ÜáS;:7#$=) + 3 "!à\É$Ö #$ + 6 4Jâ8#$ + 9 ã;!#$=)
+ < SPS07#$=)
+> :;!#$ + D 012!"#$ + F 5Å14#$ + )' 7Q?K#$ + R#$
To be consistent with Zang (2012), the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures are
multiplied by (-1) such that higher values indicate greater amounts of unexpected abnormal level of
discretionary expenditures reduced by firms to increase reported earnings.
rmCASH#$ is the abnormal cash flow from operations estimated following Roychowdhury (2006),which is
defined as the firm specific residuals from the following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each yearindustry combination.
Så;$
1
á$
∆á$
= &' + &)
+ $
+ /
+ R$
!$=)
!$=)
!$=)
!$=)
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where !$ is the total assetss at the end of period t, á$ the sales during period t and ∆á$ = á$ − á$=) .
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
TUVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ Z3

aa]VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

7lKb-?m#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if if firm i’s expected performance å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ at
year t is below its peer group’s expected performance by no more than 0.05 for year t. In other words,
å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ − Peer(å1?-*Q@Å-B]a} $ ) is within (-0.05,0). Firm i’s expected performance
å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ is calculated using analysts’ consensus forecasted EPS scaled by scaled by assets per
share at the beginning of the fiscal year. Consensus analyst forecasted EPS are the mean analysts’ forecasts
for the next period.
!*ℎ,-.-#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s current year’s performance (:;!$ ) is above the
peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words, :;!$ − b--? :;!$ is within the range of (0, 0.05).
!*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ 7lKb-?m#$ is the interaction term of !*ℎ,-.-#$ and 7lKb-?m#$ .
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
The sample period spans the years 1990 to 2012.
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Accruals Management of Firms Missing First Three Quarters’ Cumulative Peer Performance
Benchmark
Model 1: !"!#$(ñ6) = &' + &) 5,@@#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &/ LogAT#$(ñ6) + &3 BM#$(ñ6) + &6 078#$(ñ6) +
&9 ROA#$(ñ6) + &< !"!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$(ñ6) + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) +
I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$(ñ6) + O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$(ñ6) + R#$
Model 2: !S!#$(ñ6) = &' + &) 5,@@#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &/ LogAT#$(ñ6) + &3 BM#$(ñ6) + &6 078#$(ñ6) +
&9 ROA#$(ñ6) + &< !S!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$(ñ6) + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) +
I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$(ñ6) + O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$(ñ6) + R#$
!"!#$ ñ6
!S!#$ ñ6
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
0.0193***
<.0001
0.0259***
<.0001
Intercept
0.0098***
<.0001
0.0111***
<.0001
5,@@# ñ),ñ/,ñ3
-0.0049***
<.0001
-0.0055***
<.0001
012!"#ñ6
0.0004
0.3678
-0.0011***
0.0085
45#ñ6
0.0056***
<.0001
-0.0019
0.1728
078#ñ6
0.5941***
<.0001
0.5686***
<.0001
:;!#ñ6
-0.0351***
<.0001
-0.0471***
<.0001
!"!# ñ),ñ/,ñ3
0.0000
0.9557
-0.0002
0.7112
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1
-0.0006
0.3607
-0.0010
0.1599
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2
-0.0019***
0.0051
-0.0013**
0.0405
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed
Yes
Yes
Effects
29589
29589
N
2
0.3732
0.3637
Adjusted R
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
5,@@#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is a dummy variable which equals one if firm i’s cumulative performance (:;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 )
of the first three quarters in year t is below that of its peer group. :;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is calculated using income
before extraordinary items in quarter 1, add that in quarter 2, quarter 3, then use the cumulative number
divided by average of assets at the beginning of quarter 1 and the end of quarter 3;
!"!#$(ñ6) is the abnormal total accrual at the fourth quarter in year t, and !S!#$(ñ6) is the abnormal
working capital accrual at the fourth quarter in year t. The definitions of abnormal total accrual and
abnormal working capital accrual are explained in the previous tables.
LogAT#$(ñ6) is natural logarithm of asset at fourth quarter of firm i for year t; BM#$(ñ6) is book value of equity
divided by market value of equity at fourth quarter of year t for firm i; 078#$(ñ6) is total liability divided by
total assets at fourth quarter of year t; ROA#$(ñ6) is income before extraordinary items at fourth quarter of
year t in year t divided by the average of total assets of the fourth quarter and beginning of fourth quarter in
year t; !"!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is the abnormal total accrual of the first three quarters at year t, and !S!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3
is abnormal working capital accrual of the first three quarters at year t. The definitions of abnormal total
accrual and abnormal working capital accrual are explained in the previous tables.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ ñ6 , "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) or "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) equal one if firm i just meet and beat threshold
1, threshold2 or threshold 3 in the fourth quarter of year t. respectively. The definition of just meet and beat
each threshold is explained in the previous section.

Table 19
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Accruals Management of Firms Missing First Three Quarters’ Cumulative Peer Performance
Benchmark and Achieving Current Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
Model 1: !"!#$(ñ6) = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 +
&6 LogAT#$(ñ6) + &9 BM#$(ñ6) + &< 078#$(ñ6) + &> ROA#$(ñ6) + &D !"!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$(ñ6) +
&)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) + &)) "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) + I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$(ñ6) +
O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$(ñ6) + R#$
Model 2: !S!#$(ñ6) = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 +
&6 LogAT#$(ñ6) + &9 BM#$(ñ6) + &< 078#$(ñ6) + &> ROA#$(ñ6) + &D !S!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$(ñ6) +
&)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) + &)) "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) + I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$(ñ6) +
O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$(ñ6) + R#$
!"!#$ ñ6
!S!#$ ñ6
Dependent Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Coefficients
p-value
Coefficients
p-value
0.0314***
<.0001
0.0394***
<.0001
Intercept
-0.0137***
<.0001
-0.0154***
<.0001
!*ℎ,-.-#$
-0.0082***
<.0001
-0.0091***
<.0001
lKb-?m# ñ),ñ/,ñ3
0.0113***
<.0001
0.0124***
<.0001
!*ℎ,-.-#$
∗ lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3
-0.0047***
<.0001
-0.0053***
<.0001
012!"#ñ6
0.0007*
0.0837
-0.0007*
0.0932
45#ñ6
0.0067***
<.0001
-0.0008
0.5936
078#ñ6
0.6059***
<.0001
0.5821***
<.0001
:;!#ñ6
-0.0335***
<.0001
-0.0457***
<.0001
!"!# ñ),ñ/,ñ3
0.0005
0.4322
0.0003
0.6486
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1
-0.0005
0.4927
-0.0008
0.2548
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2
-0.0018***
0.0057
-0.0013**
0.0447
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
29589
29589
N
0.3732
0.3637
Adjusted R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is a dummy variable which equals one if firm i’s cumulative performance
(:;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 ) of the first three quarters in year t is below that of its peer group by no more than 0.05. In
other words, :;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 − b--? :;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is within the range of (-0.05, 0). :;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is
calculated using income before extraordinary items in quarter 1, add that in quarter 2, quarter 3, then use
the cumulative number divided by average of assets at the beginning of quarter 1 and the end of quarter 3;
!*ℎ,-.-#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s current year’s performance (:;!$ ) is above the
peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words, :;!$ − b--? :;!$ is within the range of (0, 0.05).
!*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is the interaction term of !*ℎ,-.-#$ and lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 .
!"!#$(ñ6) is the abnormal total accrual at the fourth quarter in year t, and !S!#$(ñ6) is the abnormal
working capital accrual at the fourth quarter in year t. The definitions of abnormal total accrual and
abnormal working capital accrual are explained in the previous tables.
LogAT#$(ñ6) is natural logarithm of asset at fourth quarter of firm i for year t; BM#$(ñ6) is book value of equity
divided by market value of equity at fourth quarter of year t for firm i; 078#$(ñ6) is total liability divided by
total assets at fourth quarter of year t; ROA#$(ñ6) is income before extraordinary items at fourth quarter of
year t in year t divided by the average of total assets of the fourth quarter and beginning of fourth quarter in
year t; !"!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is the abnormal total accrual of the first three quarters at year t, and !S!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3
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is abnormal working capital accrual of the first three quarters at year t. The definitions of abnormal total
accrual and abnormal working capital accrual are explained in the previous tables.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ ñ6 , "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) or "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) equal one if firm i just meet and beat threshold
1, threshold2 or threshold 3 in the fourth quarter of year t. respectively. The definition of just meet and beat
each threshold is explained in the previous section.

Table 20
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Real Earnings Management of Firms Missing First Three Quarters’ Cumulative Peer Performance
Model 1:rmUDISX #$(ñ6) = &' + &) 5,@@#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &/ LogAT#$(ñ6) + &3 BM#$(ñ6) + &6 078#$(ñ6) +
&9 ROA#$(ñ6) + &< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$(ñ6) + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) + &F !"!#$(ñ6) +
I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$(ñ6) + O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$(ñ6) + R#$
Model 2:rmCASH#$(ñ6) = &' + &) 5,@@#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &/ LogAT#$(ñ6) + &3 BM#$(ñ6) + &6 078#$(ñ6) +
&9 ROA#$(ñ6) + &< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$(ñ6) + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) + &F !"!#$(ñ6) +
I &)',I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$(ñ6) + O &)),O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$(ñ6) + R#$
Dependent Variable
Intercept
5,@@# ñ),ñ/,ñ3
012!"#(ñ6)
45#(ñ6)
078#(ñ6)
:;!#(ñ6)
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$(ñ6)
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$(ñ6)
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$(ñ6)
!"!#$(ñ6)
Year Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
N
Adjusted R2

rmUDISX #$ ñ6
Model 1
Coefficients
p-value
-0.0020*
0.0719
-0.0039***
<.0001
-0.0013***
<.0001
0.0029***
<.0001
0.0087***
<.0001
0.2303***
<.0001
0.0012***
0.0012
0.0001
0.8265
-0.0010***
0.0044
-0.4084***
<.0001
Yes
Yes
25779
0.3748

rmCASH#$ ñ6
Model 2
Coefficients
-0.0026*
-0.0007
0.0005***
-0.0007***
-0.0096***
0.5964***
0.0004
-0.0004
0.0005
-0.6737***
Yes
Yes
25779
0.6002

p-value
0.0943
0.1011
<.0001
0.0060
<.0001
<.0001
0.3736
0.3963
0.2486
<.0001

*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
rmUDISX #$(ñ6) is the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures at the fourth quarter in year t.
The definition of unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures is explained in the previous
tables.
rmCASH#$ is the abnormal cash flow from operations at the fourth quarter in year t. The definition of
abnormal cash flow from operations is explained in the pervious tables.
5,@@#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is a dummy variable which equals one if firm i’s cumulative performance (:;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 )
of the first three quarters in year t is below that of its peer group. :;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is calculated using income
before extraordinary items in quarter 1, add that in quarter 2, quarter 3, then use the cumulative number
divided by average of assets at the beginning of quarter 1 and the end of quarter 3;
!"!#$(ñ6) is the abnormal total accrual at the fourth quarter in year t. The definition of abnormal total
accrual is explained in the previous tables.
LogAT#$(ñ6) is natural logarithm of asset at fourth quarter of firm i for year t; BM#$(ñ6) is book value of equity
divided by market value of equity at fourth quarter of year t for firm i; 078#$(ñ6) is total liability divided by
total assets at fourth quarter of year t; ROA#$(ñ6) is income before extraordinary items at fourth quarter of
year t in year t divided by the average of total assets of the fourth quarter and beginning of fourth quarter in
year t; !"!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is the abnormal total accrual of the first three quarters at year t, and !S!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3
is abnormal working capital accrual of the first three quarters at year t. The definitions of abnormal total
accrual and abnormal working capital accrual are explained in the previous tables.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ ñ6 , "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) or "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) equal one if firm i just meet and beat threshold
1, threshold2 or threshold 3 in the fourth quarter of year t. respectively.
Table 21
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Real Earnings Management of Firms Missing First Three Quarters’ Cumulative Peer Performance
and Achieving Current Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
Model 1: rmUDISX #$(ñ6) = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗
lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &6 LogAT#$(ñ6) + &9 BM#$(ñ6) + &< 078#$(ñ6) + &> ROA#$(ñ6) + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$(ñ6) +
&F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) + &)) !"!#$(ñ6) + I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$(ñ6) +
O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$(ñ6) + R#$
Model 2: rmCASH#$(ñ6) = &' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &/ lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &3 !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗
lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &6 LogAT#$(ñ6) + &9 BM#$(ñ6) + &< 078#$(ñ6) + &> ROA#$(ñ6) + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$(ñ6) +
&F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) + &)) !"!#$(ñ6) + I &)/,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$(ñ6) +
O &)3,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$(ñ6) + R#$
Dependent Variable
Intercept
!*ℎ,-.-#$
lKb-?m# ñ),ñ/,ñ3
!*ℎ,-.-#$
∗ lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3
012!"#(ñ6)
45#(ñ6)
078#(ñ6)
:;!#(ñ6)
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$(ñ6)
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$(ñ6)
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$(ñ6)
!"!#$(ñ6)
Year Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
N
Adjusted R2

rmUDISX #$ ñ6
Model 1
Coefficients
p-value
0.0003
0.9080
0.0022***
<.0001
0.0022***
<.0001
-0.0040***
<.0001
-0.0016***
0.0025***
0.0070***
0.2406***
0.0013***
0.0005
-0.0007**
-0.4127***

<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0003
0.2131
0.0457
<.0001
Yes
Yes
25779
0.3736

rmCASH#$ ñ6
Model 2
Coefficients
-0.0077***
-0.0011**
-0.0005
0.0039***
0.0009***
-0.0008***
-0.0110***
0.6083***
0.0002
-0.0004
0.0004
-0.6866***
Yes
Yes
25779
0.5914

p-value
0.0052
0.0293
0.3151
0.0007
<.0001
0.0055
<.0001
<.0001
0.6098
0.3772
0.3726
<.0001

*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
rmUDISX #$(ñ6) is the unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures at the fourth quarter in year t.
The definition of unexpected abnormal level of discretionary expenditures is explained in the previous
tables.
rmCASH#$ is the abnormal cash flow from operations at the fourth quarter in year t. The definition of
abnormal cash flow from operations is explained in the pervious tables.
lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is a dummy variable which equals one if firm i’s cumulative performance
(:;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 ) of the first three quarters in year t is below that of its peer group by no more than 0.05. In
other words, :;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 − b--? :;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is within the range of (-0.05,0). :;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is
calculated using income before extraordinary items in quarter 1, add that in quarter 2, quarter 3, then use
the cumulative number divided by average of assets at the beginning of quarter 1 and the end of quarter 3;
!*ℎ,-.-#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s current year’s performance (:;!$ ) is above the
peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words, :;!$ − b--? :;!$ is within the range of (0, 0.05).
!*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is the interaction term of !*ℎ,-.-#$ and lKb-?m#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 .
!"!#$(ñ6) is the abnormal total accrual at the fourth quarter in year t. The definition of abnormal total
accrual is explained in the previous tables.
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LogAT#$(ñ6) is natural logarithm of asset at fourth quarter of firm i for year t; BM#$(ñ6) is book value of equity
divided by market value of equity at fourth quarter of year t for firm i; 078#$(ñ6) is total liability divided by
total assets at fourth quarter of year t; ROA#$(ñ6) is income before extraordinary items at fourth quarter of
year t in year t divided by the average of total assets of the fourth quarter and beginning of fourth quarter in
year t; !"!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is the abnormal total accrual of the first three quarters at year t, and !S!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3
is abnormal working capital accrual of the first three quarters at year t. The definitions of abnormal total
accrual and abnormal working capital accrual are explained in the previous tables.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ ñ6 , "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) or "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) equal one if firm i just meet and beat threshold
1, threshold2 or threshold 3 in the fourth quarter of year t. respectively. The definition of just meet and beat
each threshold is explained in the previous section.
The sample period spans the years 1990 to 2012.

Table 22
Financial Statement Restatement of Firms Achieving Current Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
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Model: Pr (:7á"!"757ã"a]\òêô #$ = 1) = å(&' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &) !"!#$ + !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ !"!#$ +
&/ 012!"#$ + &3 45#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 :;!#$ + &< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ +
I &F,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)',O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$ )
Dependent Variable
Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1)
Coefficients
p-value
-2.1541***
<.0001
Intercept
-0.0241
0.5832
!*ℎ,-.-#$
-0.4529**
0.0126
!"!#$
0.9393*
0.0877
!*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ !"!#$
0.0658***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0475*
0.0515
45#$
0.1131
0.1760
078#$
0.0972
0.4133
:;!#$
0.2821***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.1145*
0.0522
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.2139***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
29604
N
0.0460
Pseudo-R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
:-@ÅQÅ-N-KÅ_b-?,1B#$ is an indicator variable which equals to one if firm i is among the misstatement
years.
!*ℎ,-.-#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s current year’s performance (:;!$ ) is above the
peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words, :;!$ − b--? :;!$ is within the range of (0, 0.05).
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
TUVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ Z3

aa]VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

!*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ !"!#$ is the interaction term of !*ℎ,-.-#$ and !"!#$ .
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
The sample period spans the years 2000 to 2012.

Table 23
Financial Statement Restatement of Firms Achieving Current Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
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Model: Pr (:7á"!"757ã"a]\òêô #$ = 1) = å(&' + &) !*ℎ,-.-#$ + &) !S!#$ + !*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ !S!#$ +
&/ 012!"#$ + &3 45#$ + &6 078#$ + &9 :;!#$ + &< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ +
I &F,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)',O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$ )
Dependent Variable
Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1)
Coefficients
p-value
-2.1751***
<.0001
Intercept
-0.0216
0.6222
!*ℎ,-.-#$
-0.2219
0.2633
!S!#$
1.3623**
0.0192
!*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ !S!#$
0.0691***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0459*
0.0595
45#$
0.1016
0.2227
078#$
0.0277
0.8125
:;!#$
0.2826***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.1132*
0.0550
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.2092***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
29604
N
0.0458
Pseudo-R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
:-@ÅQÅ-N-KÅ_b-?,1B#$ is an indicator variable which equals to one if firm i is among the misstatement
years.
!*ℎ,-.-#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s current year’s performance (:;!$ ) is above the
peer group by no more than 0.05. In other words, :;!$ − b--? :;!$ is within the range of (0, 0.05).
!S!#$ is abnormal current accruals, which is defined as the firm specific residuals from the following
equation estimated cross-sectionally for each year-industry combination.
`UVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

!*ℎ,-.-#$ ∗ !S!#$ is the interaction term of !*ℎ,-.-#$ and !S!#$ .
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
The sample period spans the years 2000 to 2012.

Table 24
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Financial Statement Restatement of Firms Achieving Current Year’s and Missing Prior Year’s Peer
Performance Benchmark
Model: Pr (:7á"!"757ã_b7:J;L#$ = 1) = å(&' + &) !*ℎ#$ _5,@#$=) + &/ !"!#$ + &3 !*ℎ#$ _5,@#$=) ∗
!"!#$ + &6 012!"#$ + &9 45#$ + &< 078#$ + &> :;!#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ +
&)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)),I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)/,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$ )
Dependent Variable
Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1)
Coefficients
p-value
-2.1790***
<.0001
Intercept
0.0358
0.5409
!*ℎ#$ _5,@#$=)
-0.4719***
0.0096
!"!#$
0.9009*
0.0769
!*ℎ#$ _5,@#$=) ∗ !"!#$
0.0670***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0487**
0.0465
45#$
0.1103
0.1867
078#$
0.0620
0.5983
:;!#$
0.2823***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.1120*
0.0580
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.2152***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
29604
N
0.0460
Pseudo-R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
:-@ÅQÅ-N-KÅ_b-?,1B#$ is an indicator variable which equals to one if firm i is among the misstatement
years.
!*ℎ#$ _5,@#$=) is a dummy variable equals to one if two criteria are met. 1) Firm i’s current year’s
performance (:;!$ ) is above the peer group, 2) Firm i’s prior year’s performance (:;!$=) ) is below that
of its peer group.
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
TUVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ Z3

aa]VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

!*ℎ#$ _5,@#$=) ∗ !"!#$ is the interaction term of !*ℎ#$ _5,@#$=) and !"!#$ .
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
The sample period spans the years 2000 to 2012.

Table 25
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Financial Statement Restatement of Firms Achieving Current Year’s and Missing Prior Year’s Peer
Performance Benchmark
Model: Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1) = å(&' + &) !*ℎ#$ _5,@#$=) + &/ !S!#$ +
&3 !*ℎ#$ _5,@#$=) ∗ !S!#$ + &6 012!"#$ + &9 45#$ + &< 078#$ + &> :;!#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ +
&F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)),I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)/,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$ )
Dependent Variable
Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1)
Coefficients
p-value
-2.2032
0.6762
Intercept
0.0244
0.2644
!*ℎ#$ _5,@#$=)
-0.2232**
0.0390
!S!#$
1.0732***
<.0001
!*ℎ#$ _5,@#$=) ∗ !S!#$
0.0702*
0.0535
012!"#$
0.0471
0.2360
45#$
0.0987
0.9120
078#$
-0.0128***
<.0001
:;!#$
0.2831*
0.0587
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.1117***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.2103
0.6762
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
29604
N
0.0458
Pseudo-R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
:-@ÅQÅ-N-KÅ_b-?,1B#$ is an indicator variable which equals to one if firm i is among the misstatement
years.
!*ℎ#$ _5,@#$=) a dummy variable equals to one if two criteria are met. 1) Firm i’s current year’s
performance (:;!$ ) is above the peer group, 2) Firm i’s prior year’s performance (:;!$=) ) is below that
of its peer group.
!S!#$ is abnormal current accruals, which is defined as the firm specific residuals from the following
equation estimated cross-sectionally for each year-industry combination.
`UVW
UTVWXY

= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

!*ℎ#$ _5,@#$=) ∗ !S!#$ is the interaction term of !*ℎ#$ _5,@#$=) and !S!#$ .
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
The sample period spans the years 2000 to 2012.

Table 26
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Financial Statement Restatement of Firms Achieving Current Year’s and Missing Prior two Year’s
Peer Performance Benchmark
Model: Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1) = å(&' + &) !*ℎ#$ _5,@#ç $=),$=/ + &/ !"!#$ +
&3 !*ℎ#$ _5,@#ç $=),$=/ ∗ !"!#$ + &6 012!"#$ + &9 45#$ + &< 078#$ + &> :;!#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ +
&F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)),I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)/,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$ )
Dependent Variable
Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1)
Coefficients
p-value
-2.1821***
<.0001
Intercept
0.0307
0.5812
!*ℎ#$ _5,@#ç $=),$=/
-0.4774***
0.0092
!"!#$
0.8705*
0.0740
!*ℎ#$ _5,@#ç $=),$=/ ∗ !"!#$
0.0670***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0488**
0.0460
45#$
0.1114
0.1824
078#$
0.0627
0.5957
:;!#$
0.2828***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.1124*
0.0570
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.2146***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
29604
N
0.0460
Pseudo-R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
:-@ÅQÅ-N-KÅ_b-?,1B#$ is an indicator variable which equals to one if firm i is among the misstatement
years.
!*ℎ#$ _5,@#ç $=),$=/ is a dummy variable equals to one if two criteria are met. 1) Firm i’s current year’s
performance (:;!$ ) is above the peer group, 2) Firm i’s average performance (:;!ç $=),$=/ ) of the past
\êU

í\êU

WXë
WXY
two years is below that of its peer group. :;!ç $=),$=/ is calculated using
.
/
!"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from following equation
estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
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= Z' + Z)
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+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−
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UTVWXY
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aa]VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

!*ℎ#$ _5,@#ç $=),$=/ ∗ !"!#$ is the interaction term of !*ℎ#$ _5,@#ç $=),$=/ and !"!#$ .
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
The sample period spans the years 2000 to 2012.

Table 27
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Financial Statement Restatement of Firms Achieving Current Year’s and Missing Prior two Year’s
Peer Performance Benchmark
Model: Pr (:7á"!"757ã_b7:J;L#$ = 1) = å(&' + &) !*ℎ#$ _5,@#ç $=),$=/ + &/ !S!#$ +
&3 !*ℎ#$ _5,@#ç $=),$=/ ∗ !S!#$ + &6 012!"#$ + &9 45#$ + &< 078#$ + &> :;!#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ +
&F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)),I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)/,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$ )
Dependent Variable
Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1)
Coefficients
p-value
-2.2047***
<.0001
Intercept
0.0215
0.6996
!*ℎ#$ _5,@#ç $=),$=/
-0.2263
0.2616
!S!#$
0.9979**
0.0452
!*ℎ#$ _5,@#ç $=),$=/ ∗ !S!#$
0.0703***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0473*
0.0530
45#$
0.1003
0.2287
078#$
-0.0128
0.9123
:;!#$
0.2834***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.1118*
0.0584
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.2098***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
29604
N
0.0458
Pseudo-R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
:-@ÅQÅ-N-KÅ_b-?,1B#$ is an indicator variable which equals to one if firm i is among the misstatement
years.
!*ℎ#$ _5,@#ç $=),$=/ is a dummy variable equals to one if two criteria are met. 1) Firm i’s current year’s
performance (:;!$ ) is above the peer group, 2) Firm i’s average performance (:;!ç $=),$=/ ) of the past
\êU
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WXY
two years is below that of its peer group. :;!ç $=),$=/ is calculated using
.
/
!S!#$ is abnormal current accruals, which is defined as the firm specific residuals from the following
equation estimated cross-sectionally for each year-industry combination.
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∆\]^VW
UTVWXY
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∆\]`VW
UTVWXY

+ :;!$=) + R#$

!*ℎ#$ _5,@#ç $=),$=/ ∗ !S!#$ is the interaction term of !*ℎ#$ _5,@#ç $=),$=/ and !S!#$ .
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
The sample period spans the years 2000 to 2012.

Table 28
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Financial Statement Restatement of Firms Achieving Current Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
and Missing Current Year’s Expected Peer Performance Benchmark
Model: Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1) = å(&' + &) !*ℎ#$ _75,@#$ + &/ !"!#$ + &3 !*ℎ#$ _5,@#$ ∗
!"!#$ + &6 012!"#$ + &9 45#$ + &< 078#$ + &> :;!#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ +
&)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)),I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)/,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$ )
Dependent Variable
Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1)
Coefficients
p-value
-2.1567***
<.0001
Intercept
-0.1031
0.1169
!*ℎ#$ _75,@#$
-0.3445*
0.0523
!"!#$
0.0211
0.9765
!*ℎ#$ _75,@#$ ∗ !"!#$
0.0658***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0479**
0.0496
45#$
0.1163
0.1637
078#$
0.0753
0.5212
:;!#$
0.2786***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.1176**
0.0460
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.2116***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
29604
N
0.0459
Pseudo-R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
:-@ÅQÅ-N-KÅ_b-?,1B#$ is an indicator variable which equals to one if firm i is among the misstatement
years.
!*ℎ#$ _75,@#$ is a dummy variable equals to one if two criteria are met. 1) Firm i’s current year’s
performance (:;!$ ) is above the peer group, 2) Firm i’s expected performance å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ at year t
is below its peer group’s expected performance for year t. Firm i’s expected performance
å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ is calculated using analysts’ consensus forecasted EPS scaled by scaled by assets per
share at the beginning of the fiscal year. Consensus analyst forecasted EPS are the mean analysts’ forecasts
for the next period. !"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from
following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
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UTVWXY
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!*ℎ#$ _75,@#$ ∗ !"!#$ is the interaction term of !*ℎ#$ _75,@#$ and !"!#$ .
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
The sample period spans the years 2000 to 2012.
Table 29
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Financial Statement Restatement of Firms Achieving Current Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
and Missing Current Year’s Expected Peer Performance Benchmark
Model: Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1) = å(&' + &) !*ℎ#$ _75,@#$ + &/ !S!#$ + &3 !*ℎ#$ _75,@#$ ∗
!S!#$ + &6 012!"#$ + &9 45#$ + &< 078#$ + &> :;!#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ +
&)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &)),I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)/,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$ )
Dependent Variable
Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1)
Coefficients
p-value
-2.1795***
<.0001
Intercept
-0.1084*
0.0993
!*ℎ#$ _75,@#$
-0.0712
0.7136
!S!#$
0.1872
0.7985
!*ℎ#$ _75,@#$ ∗ !S!#$
0.0690***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0464*
0.0571
45#$
0.1060
0.2028
078#$
0.0032
0.9782
:;!#$
0.2797***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.1168**
0.0475
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.2068***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
29604
N
0.0457
Pseudo-R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
:-@ÅQÅ-N-KÅ_b-?,1B#$ is an indicator variable which equals to one if firm i is among the misstatement
years.
!*ℎ#$ _75,@#$ is a dummy variable equals to one if two criteria are met. 1) Firm i’s current year’s
performance (:;!$ ) is above the peer group, 2) Firm i’s expected performance å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ at year t
is below its peer group’s expected performance for year t. Firm i’s expected performance
å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ is calculated using analysts’ consensus forecasted EPS scaled by scaled by assets per
share at the beginning of the fiscal year. Consensus analyst forecasted EPS are the mean analysts’ forecasts
for the next period. !"!#$ is abnormal total accruals, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from
following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination:
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+ :;!$=) + R#$

!*ℎ#$ _75,@#$ ∗ !"!#$ is the interaction term of !*ℎ#$ _75,@#$ and !"!#$ .
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
The sample period spans the years 2000 to 2012.
Table 30
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Financial Statement Restatement of Firms Missing First Three Quarters’ Cumulative Peer
Performance Benchmark
Model:Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$(ñ6) = 1) = å(&' + &) !*ℎö#õVW úY,úë,úù + &/ !"!#$ ñ6 +
&3 !*ℎö#õVW úY,úë,úù ∗ !"!#$(ñ6) + &6 012!"#$(ñ6) + &9 45#$(ñ6) + &< 078#$(ñ6) + &> :;!#$(ñ6) +
&D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ +
O &)/,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$ )

Intercept
!*ℎö#õVW úY,úë,úù
!*ℎö#õVW

úY,úë,úù

+

Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1)
Coefficients
p-value
-2.2227***
<.0001
0.1955
0.1317

Dependent Variable

!"!#$

I &)),I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$

ñ6

∗ !"!#$(ñ6)

012!"#ñ6
45#ñ6
078#ñ6
:;!#ñ6
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3
Year Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
N
Pseudo-R2

-1.2278**
3.8939**

0.0283
0.0268

0.0247
0.0263
0.1761
1.1267**
-0.0752
-0.2683***
-0.1995***

0.1561
0.3824
0.1274
0.0289
0.2191
<.0001
0.0009
Yes
Yes
29604
0.0375

*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
:-@ÅQÅ-N-KÅ_b-?,1B#$ is an indicator variable which equals to one if the quarter four of firm i is among
the misstatement quarters.
!*ℎö#õVW úY,úë,úù is a dummy variable equals to one if two criteria are met. 1) Firm i’s current year’s
performance (:;!$ ) is above the peer group, 2) Firm i’s cumulative performance (:;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 ) of the
first three quarters in year t is below that of its peer group. :;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is calculated using income before
extraordinary items in quarter 1, add that in quarter 2, quarter 3, then use the cumulative number divided by
average of assets at the beginning of quarter 1 and the end of quarter 3;
!"!#$(ñ6) is abnormal total accruals of fourth quarter, which is the firm-specific residuals derived from
following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year-quarter combination:
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!*ℎö#õVW úY,úë,úù ∗ !"!#$(ñ6) is the interaction term of !*ℎö#õVW úY,úë,úù and !"!#$ .
LogAT#$(ñ6) is natural logarithm of asset at fourth quarter of firm i for year t; BM#$(ñ6) is book value of equity
divided by market value of equity at fourth quarter of year t for firm i; 078#$(ñ6) is total liability divided by
total assets at fourth quarter of year t; ROA#$(ñ6) is income before extraordinary items at fourth quarter of
year t in year t divided by the average of total assets of the fourth quarter and beginning of fourth quarter in
year t; !"!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is the abnormal total accrual of the first three quarters at year t, and !S!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3
is abnormal working capital accrual of the first three quarters at year t. The definitions of abnormal total
accrual and abnormal working capital accrual are explained in the previous tables.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ ñ6 , "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) or "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) equal one if firm i just meet and beat threshold
1, threshold2 or threshold 3 in the fourth quarter of year t. respectively.
Table 31
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Financial Statement Restatement of Firms Missing First Three Quarters’ Cumulative Peer
Performance Benchmark
Model:Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$(ñ6) = 1) = å(&' + &) !*ℎö#õVW úY,úë,úù + &/ !S!#$ ñ6 +
&3 !*ℎö#õVW úY,úë,úù ∗ !S!#$(ñ6) + &6 012!"#$(ñ6) + &9 45#$(ñ6) + &< 078#$(ñ6) + &> :;!#$(ñ6) +
&D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &F "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &)' "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ +
O &)/,O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$ )

Intercept
!*ℎö#õVW úY,úë,úù
!*ℎö#õVW

úY,úë,úù

+

Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1)
Coefficients
p-value
-2.2269***
<.0001
0.2325*
0.0662

Dependent Variable

!S!#$

I &)),I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$

ñ6

∗ !S!#$(ñ6)

012!"#ñ6
45#ñ6
078#ñ6
:;!#ñ6
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3
Year Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
N
Pseudo-R2

-1.1698**
3.5503**

0.0401
0.0474

0.0245
0.0252
0.1682
1.0638**
-0.0765
-0.2683***
-0.1981***

0.1614
0.3997
0.1455
0.0369
0.2109
<.0001
0.0010
Yes
Yes
29604
0.0374

*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
:-@ÅQÅ-N-KÅ_b-?,1B#$ is an indicator variable which equals to one if the quarter four of firm i is among
the misstatement quarters.
!*ℎö#õVW úY,úë,úù is a dummy variable equals to one if two criteria are met. 1) Firm i’s current year’s
performance (:;!$ ) is above the peer group, 2) Firm i’s cumulative performance (:;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 ) of the
first three quarters in year t is below that of its peer group. :;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is calculated using income before
extraordinary items in quarter 1, add that in quarter 2, quarter 3, then use the cumulative number divided by
average of assets at the beginning of quarter 1 and the end of quarter 3;
!S!#$(ñ6) is abnormal current accruals of the fourth quarter, which is defined as the firm specific residuals
from the following equation estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year-quarter combination.
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= Z' + Z)

)
UTVWXY

+ Z/

∆\]^VW
UTVWXY

−

∆\]`VW
UTVWXY
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!*ℎö#õVW úY,úë,úù ∗ !S!#$(ñ6) is the interaction term of !*ℎö#õVW úY,úë,úù and !"!#$ .
LogAT#$(ñ6) is natural logarithm of asset at fourth quarter of firm i for year t; BM#$(ñ6) is book value of equity
divided by market value of equity at fourth quarter of year t for firm i; 078#$(ñ6) is total liability divided by
total assets at fourth quarter of year t; ROA#$(ñ6) is income before extraordinary items at fourth quarter of
year t in year t divided by the average of total assets of the fourth quarter and beginning of fourth quarter in
year t; !"!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is the abnormal total accrual of the first three quarters at year t, and !S!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3
is abnormal working capital accrual of the first three quarters at year t. The definitions of abnormal total
accrual and abnormal working capital accrual are explained in the previous tables.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ ñ6 , "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) or "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) equal one if firm i just meet and beat threshold
1, threshold2 or threshold 3 in the fourth quarter of year t. respectively.
Table 32
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Financial Statement Restatement of Firms Missing Prior Year’s Peer Performance Benchmark
Model: Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1) = å(&' + &) 5,@@#$=) + &/ 012!"#$ + &3 45#$ +
&6 078#$ + &9 :;!#$ + &< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ +
I &F,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)',O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$ )
Dependent Variable
Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1)
Coefficients
p-value
-2.1954***
<.0001
Intercept
0.1414***
0.0003
5,@@#$=)
0.0643***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0435*
0.0755
45#$
0.0617
0.4604
078#$
0.1038
0.3631
:;!#$
0.2695***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.098*
0.0966
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.2025***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
29604
N
0.0470
Pseudo-R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
:-@ÅQÅ-N-KÅ_b-?,1B#$ is an indicator variable which equals to one if firm i is among the misstatement
years.
5,@@#$=) is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s prior year’s performance (:;!$=) ) is below that
of its peer group.
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
The sample period spans the years 2000 to 2012.

Table 33
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Financial Statement Restatement of Firms Missing Prior Two Year’s Mean Peer Performance
Benchmark
Model: Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1) = å(&' + &) 5,@@#ç $=),$=/ + &/ 012!"#$ + &3 45#$ +
&6 078#$ + &9 :;!#$ + &< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ +
I &F,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)',O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$ )
Dependent Variable
Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1)
Coefficients
p-value
-2.2072***
<.0001
Intercept
0.1651***
<.0001
5,@@#ç($=),$=/)
0.0644***
<.0001
LogAT#$
0.0449*
0.0683
BM#$
0.0558
0.5045
078#$
0.109
0.334
ROA#$
0.2705***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$
-0.0928
0.1158
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$
-0.1998***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
29604
N
0.0470
Pseudo-R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
:-@ÅQÅ-N-KÅ_b-?,1B#$ is an indicator variable which equals to one if firm i is among the misstatement
years.
5,@@#ç($=),$=/) is a dummy variable and it equals one if firm i’s average performance (:;!ç $=),$=/ ) of
\êU
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the past two years is below that of its peer group. :;!ç $=),$=/ is calculated using
.
/
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
The sample period spans the years 2000 to 2012.

Table 34
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Financial Statement Restatement of Firms Missing Current Year’s Expected Peer Performance
Benchmark
Model: Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1) = å(&' + &) 75,@@#$ + &/ 012!"#$ + &3 45#$ + &6 078#$ +
&9 :;!#$ + &< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ + I &F,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ +
O &)',O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$ )
Dependent Variable
Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1)
Coefficients
p-value
-2.1834***
<.0001
Intercept
0.1142***
0.0046
75,@@#$
0.0647***
<.0001
012!"#$
0.0413*
0.0899
45#$
0.0706
0.3972
078#$
0.1013
0.388
:;!#$
0.2699***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1
-0.1052*
0.0739
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2
-0.2081***
<.0001
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
Yes
29604
N
0.0460
Pseudo-R2
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
:-@ÅQÅ-N-KÅ_b-?,1B#$ is an indicator variable which equals to one if firm i is among the misstatement
years.
75,@@#$ is a dummy variable and it equals one if if firm i’s expected performance å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ at
year t is below its peer group’s expected performance for year t. Firm i’s expected performance
å1?-*Q@Å-B_7bá$ is calculated using analysts’ consensus forecasted EPS scaled by scaled by assets per
share at the beginning of the fiscal year. Consensus analyst forecasted EPS are the mean analysts’ forecasts
for the next period.
LogAT#$ is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for year t. BM#$ is the book value of equity divided
by market value of equity in year t for firm i. ROA#$ is return on assets defined as income before
extraordinary items in year t divided by the average of total assets. 078#$ is total liability divided by total
assets in year t.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm avoids losses by a small margin, which is
defined as income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value within the range of
[0.02]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ is the indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm avoids earnings declines by a small
margin, which is defined as change in the income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to year t, scaled
by the beginning market value within the range of [0.01]. "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ is an indicator variable equal to 1
if the firm avoids negative earnings surprises by a small margin, which is defined as earnings surprises
scaled by beginning price per share within the range of [0.0025].
The sample period spans the years 2000 to 2012.

Table 35
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Financial Statement Restatement of Firms Missing First Three Quarters’ Cumulative Peer
Performance Benchmark
Model: Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$(ñ6) = 1) = å(&' + &) 5,@@#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 + &/ 012!"#$(ñ6) +
&3 45#$(ñ6) + &6 078#$(ñ6) + &9 :;!#$(ñ6) + &< "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ + &> "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$ + &D "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$ +
I &F,I JKBLMNN,-@I,#$ + O &)',O P-Q?LMNN,-@O,#$ + R#$ )
Dependent Variable
Pr (:7á"!"757ã"_b7:J;L#$ = 1)
Coefficients
p-value
-2.2419***
<.0001
Intercept
0.1888***
0.0014
5,@@# ñ),ñ/,ñ3
0.0199
0.2559
012!"#ñ6
0.0174
0.551
45#ñ6
0.1357
0.2417
078#ñ6
0.8756**
0.038
:;!#ñ6
-0.0561
0.3616
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1
-0.2524***
0.0002
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2
-0.1826***
0.0024
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Industry Fixed Effects
Yes
14682
N
Pseudo-R2
0.0370
*,**,*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
:-@ÅQÅ-N-KÅ_b-?,1B#$ is an indicator variable which equals to one if the quarter four of firm i is among
the misstatement quarters.
5,@@#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is a dummy variable which equals one if firm i’s cumulative performance (:;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 )
of the first three quarters in year t is below that of its peer group. :;! ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is calculated using income
before extraordinary items in quarter 1, add that in quarter 2, quarter 3, then use the cumulative number
divided by average of assets at the beginning of quarter 1 and the end of quarter 3;
LogAT#$(ñ6) is natural logarithm of asset at fourth quarter of firm i for year t; BM#$(ñ6) is book value of equity
divided by market value of equity at fourth quarter of year t for firm i; 078#$(ñ6) is total liability divided by
total assets at fourth quarter of year t; ROA#$(ñ6) is income before extraordinary items at fourth quarter of
year t in year t divided by the average of total assets of the fourth quarter and beginning of fourth quarter in
year t; !"!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3 is the abnormal total accrual of the first three quarters at year t, and !S!#$ ñ),ñ/,ñ3
is abnormal working capital accrual of the first three quarters at year t. The definitions of abnormal total
accrual and abnormal working capital accrual are explained in the previous tables.
"ℎ?-@ℎ1AB1#$ ñ6 , "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB2#$(ñ6) or "ℎ?-@ℎ1AB3#$(ñ6) equal one if firm i just meet and beat threshold
1, threshold2 or threshold 3 in the fourth quarter of year t. respectively. The definition of just meet and beat
each threshold is explained in the previous section.
The sample period spans the years 2000 to 2012.
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